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ABSTRACT
Traditional economic analysis of markets with asymmetric information assumes that uninformed
agents account for the incentives of informed agents to distort information. We analyze whether
investors in the stock market internalize such incentives. Stock recommendations of security analysts
are likely to be biased upwards, particularly if the issuing analyst is affiliated with the underwriter
of the recommended stock. Using the NYSE Trades and Quotations database, we find that large
(institutional) traders account for the upward bias and exert no abnormal trade reaction to buy
recommendations, and significant selling pressure in response to hold recommendations. Small
(individual) traders do not account for the upward shift and exert significantly positive pressure for
buys and zero pressure for hold recommendations. Moreover, large traders discount  positive
recommendations from affiliated analysts more than from unaffiliated analysts, while small traders
do not distinguish between them. The naive trading behavior of small investors induces negative
abnormal portfolio returns.
Ulrike Malmendier












Traditional economic analysis of markets with asymmetric information builds on the assumption 
that uninformed agents account for the incentives of informed agents to distort information. In 
the lemons model [Akerlof, 1970], the uninformed agent understands that the informed agent 
does not have an incentive to reveal negative features of the product and that he would rather 
advertise the lemon as a “hidden gem.” Consequently, the uninformed agent does not rely on 
such unverifiable information, and the informed agent abstains from providing it in the first 
place. To put it in the context of cheap talk games, if all Sender-types have the same preferences 
over the Receiver’s action, e.g. that the Receiver buys the good the Sender is selling, then cheap 
talk cannot be informative [Crawford and Sobel, 1982]. 
This result changes if the uninformed agent is naive about the information provided. In 
this case, the uninformed agent would accept cheap talk at face value, and the informed agent 
would want to provide biased information to extract maximum profits from subsequent economic 
interactions. 
What happens in real markets? Are agents sophisticated enough to understand the 
informed agents’ incentives to distort information? Or do they naively trust the informed agents? 
In this paper, we analyze naiveté about information provision in the market for stocks and stock 
recommendations. Analysts of brokerage firms are more informed about the value of a stock and 
provide investors with information in the form of buy, hold, and sell recommendations. They 
have, however, incentives to distort this information upward. Positive recommendations are more 
likely to generate trading commissions than negative ones, given short-selling constraints. 
Positive recommendations also allow analysts to gain continued access to information from the 
management of the recommended firm.
1 The incentives to bias recommendations upward are 
even stronger for “affiliated” analysts, whose brokerage belongs to an investment bank 
underwriting security issuances of the firms covered by the analyst. Positive analyst coverage 
after an equity issuance is often viewed as part of an implicit agreement between underwriter and   2
issuer.
2 Moreover, analysts’ compensation depends, either directly or indirectly, on their 
“support” in generating profits for the corporate finance department.
3  
If investors are rational, they account for such informational distortions of analyst 
recommendations. First, they should discount positive and neutral recommendations, i. e. exert 
less buy pressure in response to buy and strong buy recommendations than they would if these 
recommendations were undistorted. Second, they should discount even more recommendations 
from analysts who are affiliated with the underwriter of an issuer. If, however, investors are 
naive and do not discount enough for analysts’ incentives, they might overreact to positive 
recommendations and not account for affiliation. 
Naive behavior adversely affects investors’ wealth since investors misallocate their 
funds. It also impacts the industrial organization of brokerage firms. If investors are naive, 
independent brokerage is unlikely to be a profitable business since those firms with analysts and 
corporate finance divisions united under one roof get (at least) as much attention from investors 
while having informational advantages. 
We examine empirically whether investors account for analysts’ incentives in their 
trading decision. First, using the I/B/E/S data set, we show that the vast majority of 
recommendations are positive or neutral; only 4.5% are negative. The distribution is even more 
skewed for recommendations of affiliated analysts. We also show that a trading strategy that 
takes recommendations literally induces losses. Moreover, these losses are significantly larger 
for recommendations of affiliated analysts compared to those of unaffiliated analysts, consistent 
with previous literature on analyst affiliation [Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 
1999]. Over any investment horizon between three months and five years, the portfolio based on 
unaffiliated recommendations outperforms the portfolio based on affiliated recommendations.  
Second, we analyze the trade reaction of investors to the issuance of analyst 
recommendations. We distinguish between small and large investors to allow for the possibility 
that individual agents are subject to biases, while firms and their associated professionals 
rationally account for informational distortions. This distinction follows the previous behavioral   3
literature on biases in markets, which points to the specialization and experience of firms as well 
as competitive pressure to which firms but not individuals are exposed.
4 Following previous 
market microstructure literature [Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000], we distinguish between small 
(individual) and large (institutional) investors based on the size of their trades. Using trading data 
from the New York Stock Exchange Trades and Quotations (TAQ) database (1993-2002), we 
find distinctly different trade reactions to recommendations among large and small investors. 
First, large investors react less positively than small investors to buy and hold recommendations. 
Large investors display less abnormal buy pressure in response to buy and strong buy 
recommendations than small investors. And, while small investors do not display any abnormal 
trading behavior in response to hold recommendations, large investors sell. Second, large 
investors distinguish between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and exert buy pressure only 
after strong buy recommendations of unaffiliated analysts and not after positive 
recommendations of affiliated analysts. Small traders are equally enthusiastic about stocks 
recommended by affiliated and by unaffiliated analysts. 
The results suggest that large investors act according to rational economic theory and 
account for the incentives of analysts, but small investors do not. What explains these differences 
in trade reaction? At least the second result, the failure of small investors to differentiate between 
recommendations from affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, is likely to be affected by higher 
informational costs to identify analysts’ affiliation. We find, however, that informational 
constraints do not suffice to explain the suboptimal behavior of small investors. If investors were 
fully rational about analyst incentive but lacking information about analyst affiliation, their 
average reaction to positive recommendations should still take the upward bias among all 
analysts into account. For example, small investors should sell in response to hold 
recommendations (as large investors do), regardless of whether the analyst is affiliated or not. 
Moreover, additional results suggest that even the second result is at least partly driven by 
investor naiveté. If only informational constraints prevented small investors from rationally 
responding to analyst affiliation, a partial solution would be to focus on those analysts who are 
“visibly” unaffiliated. For example, analysts whose financial institutions do not have any   4
associated corporate finance department and are never involved in any underwriting are easily 
identified as “independent.” We find that, in fact, recommendations of such “never-affiliated” 
analysts have the least upward bias. However, small investors do not display abnormal trade 
reaction in response to their recommendation. 
We interpret our results as evidence that small investors fail to adjust for the incentive 
conflicts on the part of analysts and fail to discount the investment advice sufficiently. In many 
settings, different psychological explanations of investor naiveté are possible. Investors may take 
the distorted information at face value due to limited attention. Or, they may be genuinely “too 
trusting.” Our analysis allows some distinction. Since small investors are strongly reacting to the 
recommendations themselves, they should also realize the extremely low portion of sell 
recommendations (about 5%) and be induced to consider distortions. Mere inattention is unlikely 
to explain our results. 
The naive decision-making has negative welfare consequences, as demonstrated by the 
negative returns to portfolios following recommendations. Further empirical analysis indicates 
that competitive market forces may exacerbate rather than remedy the effect. We show that the 
more analysts are covering a stock, the more affiliated recommendations are distorted upwards. 
The findings of this paper are likely to extend to other market settings in which an 
uninformed agent receives advice from an informed agent who has different interests. For 
example, firms provide consumers only with positive product information in advertisements. 
Consumers who take all advertisements at face value may over-consume or misallocate their 
resources to goods of better advertisers. Similarly, salesmen can judge which product is most 
suitable for their clients, but may also be inclined to recommend the product that maximizes their 
commission. Our findings suggest that individuals do not always account sufficiently for such 
misalignment of incentives, but follow distorted advice too closely. Competition among 
information providers appears to be insufficient to endogenously trigger the rise of institutions 
that cater to the interest of the individual consumer.   5
This paper relates to two main branches of literature in behavioral economics and in 
finance. A growing literature in behavioral economics analyzes the reaction of firms to consumer 
or investor biases in individual decision-making.  These papers show that market interaction does 
not eliminate biases but may rather exacerbate their effect since firms tailor their contracts and 
products to take advantage of them [DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Gabaix and Laibson, 
2004]. The specific bias, naiveté about incentives, and the resulting firm reaction, the provision 
of distorted information, may be related to the experimental finding that subjects embrace the 
advice of other subjects, even if the advice-givers do not have superior information [Schotter, 
2003]. In the finance literature, this paper builds upon previous evidence that investors incur 
losses if they follow analyst recommendations “literally.” Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and 
Trueman [2001] show that only sophisticated interpretations of analyst recommendations, such 
as buying the most highly buy-recommended stocks and short selling the most strongly sell-
recommended stocks, will lead to positive portfolio returns.  Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee 
[2004] identify the change in recommendations (as opposed to the level of recommendations) as 
informative. Their findings are consistent with the evidence in this paper that the level of analyst 
recommendations ought to be adjusted downwards but the ordering is informative.  We also 
build on the evidence in Lin and McNichols [1998] and Michaely and Womack [1999] that stock 
recommendations by affiliated analysts are more favorable but perform more poorly over short 
(three-day) and long (up to two-year) horizons. Iskoz [2002] confirms these results for strong 
buy recommendations and provides evidence that institutional investors may be accounting for 
the distortions of affiliated analysts, as far as one can deduce from the quarterly changes in 
institutional ownership. From a theory perspective, Morgan and Stocken [2003] analyze the case 
that investors are perfectly rational but do not know whether the analyst is biased or not. Their 
paper shows that it is difficult to reconcile investor rationality with the fact that different 
investors react to the same recommendation in different ways. Ottaviani and Squintani [2004] 
analyze a cheap-talk model in which the receiver may be naive and believes that the sender is 
honest, leading to too much communication and biased equilibrium allocation. The behavioral-
finance literature on investor reaction to firms’ accounting choices, issuance decisions, and   6
repurchase offers provides evidence of such naiveté.
5 Investors appear to be “credulous” and not 
to discount enough for the incentives of firms to manipulate the signal. Finally, our paper relates 
to the market microstructure literature on trading reactions. We employ the modified Lee and 
Ready [1991] algorithm to classify trades as buyer- or seller-initiated [following Odders-White 
2000] and measure trade reaction as in Lee [1992], Hvidkjaer [2001], and Shanthikumar [2003]. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research 
question and research design. Section 3 provides details on the various sources of data employed 
in this study. In Section 4, we present the empirical results on distortions in analyst 
recommendations, on the trade reaction of small and large investors, and on the associated 
returns. We also discuss alternative explanations for the trading behavior of small investors. 
Section 5 explores, in more detail, how firms respond to the biases in individual trade decisions, 
and points to the effects of competition among analysts as captured by coverage. Section 6 
concludes. 
II. Empirical Strategy 
1. Analyst Incentives 
Sell-side analysts issue recommendations about the specific set of stocks they are covering. 
Recommendations typically range from “strong sell” to “strong buy.” These recommendations 
are published in various forms such as analyst reports, online data sources,
6 radio and TV 
interviews on CNBC and other channels, and news articles.  In particular, online resources allow  
investors to get fast and easy access to current recommendations regarding a stock, as shown in 
the sample webpage from finance.yahoo.com (Figure I).
7 The example of Apache Corp. shows 
recommendations of both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and provides information on 
averages, industry comparisons, upgrades, and downgrades. In addition, the company makes its 
press releases (including information about the recent stock offering and its lead underwriter) 
easily available online. Investors can get to this detailed information with a few clicks from the 
yahoo site.
8   7
Sell-side analysts face a well-known conflict of interest when providing investment 
advice in the form of recommendations. On the one hand, it is their job to provide profound 
security analyses and reliable recommendations to customers. Customers will, in turn, invest in 
the recommended stocks via the associated brokerage firm. The brokerage firm earns trading 
commissions and additional fees for their recommendations and reports. Good recommendations 
enhance the reputation of an analyst and thus lead to higher compensation. 
On the other hand, analysts have incentives to bias their recommendations upwards. One 
reason is simply that buy recommendations are more likely to generate trading business than sell 
recommendations. A buy recommendation can induce any investor to buy a stock; a sell 
recommendation, however, is mostly relevant for current owners of the stocks, given the short-
selling constraints investors face. In addition, analysts are exposed to pressure from the 
management of the company they are covering. In order to ensure increases in shareholder value 
of their company, management often calls up analysts and complains about ratings that are “too 
low” and even tends to “freeze out” analysts who do not give positive recommendations.
9 
Similarly, buy-side clients may push sell-side analysts to maintain positive recommendations on 
stocks they hold.
10 
Analysts have additional reasons to distort recommendations upward if their brokerage 
firm is part of an investment bank that is underwriting security issuances. Favorable 
recommendations are generally viewed as a precondition for investment banks to get future 
underwriting deals and as an implicit condition of existing underwriting contracts.
11 Analysts 
whose brokerage firm is associated with an investment bank are likely to be exposed to pressure 
(and monetary incentives) from corporate finance departments to support underwriting business 
with positive recommendations. 
As a result, analysts are trading off their reputational capital with the incentive to 
generate portfolio transactions and, in the case of affiliation with an investment bank, the 
incentive to support underwriting business. 
Note that sorting may enhance the upward bias of analyst recommendations. Beyond the 
largest cap stocks and corporate finance clients, it is typically up to the analysts to select the   8
stocks they cover. They are likely to choose companies whose investment prospects they judge 
favorably, hoping that those are of most interest to their buy-side clients. If they do not account 
for winner’s curse, their recommendations of covered stocks will be too positive. Similarly, the 
corporate finance division may be affected by winner’s curse. The investment bank’s decision to 
finance a particular company implies a fundamentally positive view on that company – maybe 
more positive than warranted by the companies performance. While the subsequent analysis 
focuses on the incentive distortions, bias due to sorting has the same implications: 
Recommendations are likely to be biased upwards, in particular if the analyst is affiliated. 
2. Investor Rationality 
The effect of these distortions of analyst recommendations depends on investor rationality. If 
investors accounted for the incentives of analysts, they would discount positive analyst 
recommendations in general and those of affiliated analysts in particular. This implies that 
rational investors should shift the level of recommendations down and may want to sell in 
response to hold recommendations and may not want to buy (but just to hold) in response to buy 
recommendations. Only strong buy recommendations should induce abnormal buy reaction. 
Moreover, their buy reaction should be stronger in response to positive recommendations of 
unaffiliated analysts than to those of affiliated analysts.  The left part of Figure II summarizes the 
rational trade reaction schematically.  Note that, in the rough classification of Figure II, a rational 
investor would never buy after any affiliated recommendation.
12 Such trading behavior would, in 
turn, create demand for independent brokerages. 
If, however, investors are naive about analyst incentives, they do not account for the 
general upward bias. As a result, their trade reaction to strong buy, buy and hold 
recommendations is too positive on average. Rather than selling in response to hold 
recommendations and holding in response to buy recommendations, naive agents follow 
recommendations literally and hold after hold recommendations and buy after buy 
recommendations.    9
The lack of downward adjustment after positive or neutral recommendations also implies 
overreaction to negative recommendations. Naive investors will display abnormal sell pressure 
only if a stock becomes a bad enough investment to be downgraded to “sell” or “strong sell.” 
Thus, they will react more negatively to sell and strong sell recommendations than rational 
investors would. 
Moreover, naive agents do not provide for the additional incentive distortion of affiliated 
analysts and display the same reaction to the recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts. Thus, the deviation from rational trading behavior, both in the form of overreaction to 
hold, buy, and strong buy recommendations and in the form of the delayed sell reactions, will be 
exacerbated in the case of affiliated analyst recommendations. The right part of Figure II 
summarizes the naive trade reaction. 
In this paper, we consider separately the trading behavior of large (institutional) investors 
and small (individual) investors and analyze whether they are able to account for the misaligned 
incentives of analysts. The distinction between large and small investors reflects that large, 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, benefit from numerous professional resources that 
allow them to overcome the biases of individuals.
13 Institutional investors rely on professional 
investment managers who spend their full daily working time on these investment decisions and 
may specialize in certain types of investments or particular industries. For individual investors, 
instead, investing their funds is one of numerous, widely different, every-day decisions. In 
addition, repetition, more frequent feedback, and specialization make it easier for decision-
makers in large institutions (than for individual investors) to learn about analysts’ incentives to 
distort information. Market pressure reinforces the effect. Institutions that invest sub-optimally – 
for instance, because they are not accounting for distortions in analyst information – lose 
investors and will be driven out of the market. No such pressure exists for individual investors. 
Finally, sorting works in favor of institutional investors. Individuals working in the finance 
industry have a better financial education and better skills in financial decision-making than the   10
average individual investor, as illustrated by the anomalous trade reaction of small traders to 
earnings news [Lee 1992]. 
3. Empirical measures 
Investor type. We separate small and large investors by trading size. Following the analysis of 
Lee and Radhakrishna [2000], we choose dollar cutoffs rather than share-based cutoffs in order 
to minimize noise in separating individuals from institutions. We also incorporate their 
suggestion to use two cutoffs, with a buffer zone between small and large trades. Specifically we 
choose the cutoffs based on results for three-month TORQ sample from 1990-91, in which actual 
information on the identity of traders was available to check the accuracy of the trade-size based 
classification method. The lower cutoff of $20,000 splits small and medium trades, and the 
higher cutoff of $50,000 splits medium and large trades.
14  
Affiliation.  Our empirical measures of analyst affiliation are based on the underwriting 
relationship of the analyst’s brokerage house with the firm the analyst is reporting on. Following 
previous literature,
15 we identify analysts as affiliated if their investment bank was the lead 
underwriter of an initial public offering (IPO) of the recommended stock in the past five years or 
of a secondary equity offering (SEO) in the past two years. We also include co-underwriters over 
the same respective periods. We further examine two possible sources of underwriting bias that 
have not been explored in the previous literature. The first source is future affiliation, i.e. banks 
underwriting an SEO in the next one or two years. There are several potential sources of 
incentives for future underwriters to issue higher recommendations, including attempts to gain 
the future business, pressure to increase the potential offer price of the future security offering 
and winner’s curse. The number of additional firms we capture with this measure is small, 
though, since most future underwriters are in previous underwriting relationships. A second type 
of affiliation that has not been examined previously is bond underwriting, in particular lead 
underwriting of bonds in the past year. If positive coverage is part of an implicit agreement   11
between underwriter and equity issuer, then there is no obvious reason this should be different 
for bond issuance. 
Trade Reaction. To capture the reaction of small and large investors to analyst 
recommendations, we employ measures of “directional trade” (trade initiation). These measures, 
first developed by Lee and Ready [1991], are market microstructure algorithms that aim at 
capturing the buy and sell pressure exerted by traders. They exploit the fact that most trades take 
place when one side of the transaction demands immediate execution. Accordingly, trades are 
classified as “buyer-initiated” if the buyer demands immediate execution and as “seller-initiated” 
if the seller demands immediate execution. An abnormally high balance of buyer-initiated trades 
indicates buy pressure; an abnormally high balance of seller-initiated trades indicates sell 
pressure. In general, the side of a trade demanding faster execution represents a market order, i.e. 
an order to be executed immediately at the current market price. For example, investors who 
have received positive information about a firm and who believe that the stock price will rise 
would not place a limit order to buy. That limit order might never be filled. Instead, they would 
place a market order, and demand to buy immediately – before the price goes up further. 
We use the modified version of the Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm, developed in 
Odders-White [2000], to determine which side initiated the trade. The algorithm matches a trade 
to the most recent quote that precedes the trade by at least 5 seconds. If a price is nearer the bid 
price it is classified as seller initiated, and if it is closer to the ask price it is classified as buyer 
initiated. If a trade is at the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, it is classified based on a “tick test. 
The tick test categorizes a trade as buyer-initiated if the trade occurs at a price higher than the 
price of the previous trade (uptick), and as seller-initiated if the trade is on a downtick. We drop 
trades at the bid-ask midpoint, which are also the same price as in preceding trades.
16 
As a proxy of buy pressure, we will consider three measures. The net number of buy-
initiated trades for firm i, investor type x, and date t is defined as 
(1)   t x i t x i t x i sells buys NB , , , , , , − =
 
  
The raw trade imbalance measure for firm i, investor type x, and date t is calculated as   12
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Finally, we normalize this measure by subtracting off the firm-year mean, and dividing by the 
firm-year standard deviation, separately for each investor type, as in Shanthikumar [2003]: 
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The adjustments are made by year to account for changes in trading behavior over time. We also 
adjust by firm because the trading behavior for various firms may have consistent differences. 
These normalizations allows us to compare trading behavior over time and among firms and 
replaces year- and firm-fixed effects in the regression framework. Dividing by the standard 
deviation controls for systematic differences in the volatility of large trades and small trades or in 
the volatility of the stocks large and small traders invest in. It makes comparisons between small 
and large investors possible and rules out that a seemingly more extreme reaction is just the 
result of higher volatility in trade imbalances over time.  
Ownership. In order to evaluate the economic meaning of our trading variables, we also compare 
the trading behavior of investors to changes in institutional ownership, based on the 
CDA/Spectrum Institutional Holdings Database. Since institutional ownership data is only 
available on a quarterly basis (from 13f SEC filings), we aggregate the daily trade measures over 
the corresponding quarterly periods. Table I displays the correlations between ownership change 
and the trading variables. Large-trader buy pressure is significantly correlated with an increase in 
institutional ownership and small-trader buy pressure with a decrease. This implies that buy 
pressure as measured by a positive trade imbalance, does not only capture investor enthusiasm 
for a stock, but captures actual increases in the aggregate ownership of the relevant class of 
investors as well.   13
III. Data 
We analyze three main sources of data: data on securities trading, data on analyst 
recommendations, and data on underwriting. 
The raw trading data is collected from the New York Stock Exchange Trades and 
Quotations database (TAQ). The TAQ database reports every round-lot trade and every quote 
from January 1, 1993 onwards on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ. We examine ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, excluding certificates and 
depository receipts. We also exclude foreign companies, Americus trust components, closed-end 
fund shares and REITs. The final trading sample includes 2801 securities for 2723 firms, as 
defined by 8-digit and 6-digit CUSIPs, respectively. 
We obtain analyst recommendations and information about the analyst and brokerage 
firm from I/B/E/S starting from October 29, 1993. I/B/E/S converts the recommendation formats 
of different brokerage houses into one uniform numerical format. Like other authors [Jegadeesh, 
Kim, Krische and Lee, 2004], we reverse the original I/B/E/S coding to the following, more 
intuitive scheme: 5=strong buy, 4=buy, 3=hold, 2=sell, 1=strong. A “higher” recommendation is 
better, and an “upgrade” translates into a positive change in the numerical value. 
Note that the I/B/E/S data contains an unusually high number of recommendations during 
the first three months of the sample period. While the number of recommendations per year – 
and even per month – is fairly uniform during the period from February 1994 through 2001, the 
first two months and three days contain a multiple of observations. This may be due to 
differences in the way I/B/E/S dealt with data at the beginning of the sample period. 
Alternatively, it may have to do with large layoffs in the securities industry during that time. In 
fact, the number of firms remains relatively stable, while the number of analysts and stocks 
covered declines sharply, from 626 analysts and 1166 stocks in November 1993 to 435 analysts 
and 591 stocks in February 1994. Consulting the employment data of the Securities Industry 
Association (SIA), we found that employment in the industry slowed in 1994 and 1995.   14
However, the more detailed monthly data from U.S. Dept. of Labor Statistics (DOLS) indicates 
that drop off is not as sharp as the I/B/E/S data suggests. That may be because the DOLS data 
includes all employees in the securities industry, and equity analysts may have been laid off at a 
disproportionate rate. But it also leaves room for concerns about data consistency within the 
I/B/E/S sample. From February 1994 on, the number gradually increases from 11,596 in 1995 
until in peaks at 13,944 in 1999. The number of recommendations declines in 2000 and 2001, but 
then skyrockets in 2002, with a total of 20,560 recommendations made that year. To exclude the 
“scandal effects” from 2001 and 2002 and reporting anomalies in the I/B/E/S data set, we focus 
on the period from February 1994 through July 2001, containing 2252 securities and 2229 firms, 
but run all regressions for both alternative sample periods. 
In addition, we investigated how accessible recommendations are to either type of 
investor. We hand-collected additional brokerage company information from company 
publications and company websites in order to identify which type of customer a brokerage firm 
targets, institutions or individuals. To give two examples, we identified Adams, Harkness & Hill 
as serving just institutional clients from their mission statement: “Adams, Harkness & Hill is one 
of the largest independent research, brokerage, and investment banking firms serving the 
institutional market.” Similarly, we identified Alliance as serving both markets from their 
statement: “At Alliance Capital, we're proud to provide a wide range of investment management 
services to a diverse group of investors worldwide, including institutional clients, high-net-worth 
individuals and mutual fund investors.” If a firm does not specify which type of client they focus 
on, the lines of business and services offered often reveal whether this firm handles both types of 
clients or just one. In particular, research firms with only 10-15 analysts that are very specialized 
in a particular field, such as energy, healthcare, insurance, oil and gas, typically serve only a 
select group of institutional investors. Overall, we obtained the information for about 85% of the 
brokerage firms.
17 We found that only 5.9 % consider themselves retail brokerages (e.g. Credit 
Swiss Private Banking), 16.2% brokerages for institutions (e.g. DSP/Merrill Lynch or SG 
Cowen), but 77.9% are targeting both individuals and institutions. Moreover, we found that even   15
recommendations targeted towards institutions are often available to retail clients for two 
reasons. First, numerous institutions-oriented firms have in recent years acquired or made 
minority investments in retail brokerage firms in order to have a retail distribution outlet for IPO 
shares.
18 As a result, their research reports end up in the hands of retail customers through the 
retail subsidiary. Second, retail brokerage firms, such as Charles Schwab, allow clients to 
download reports from research firms that they have partnerships with (such as Goldman Sachs). 
An investor can also subscribe to a service such as Yahoo Finance or other websites mentioned 
in Section II.1 to access reports. It is thus reasonable to assume that individual investors will 
have access to most if not all recommendations contained in our data set. 
We use the SDC New Issues database to obtain underwriting data from 1987 to 2002. We 
link I/B/E/S broker firms and SDC underwriters with the company names provided by the 
I/B/E/S recommendation broker identification file and the SDC database. We improve the match 
using company websites and news articles, in particular to determine subsidiary relationships and 
corporate name changes. Finally, we use the mapping from Kolasinski and Kothari [2004] to 
identify additional matches.
19 
We obtain security prices, returns, and share information from CRSP, and financial 
variables of the companies from COMPUSTAT. The merged data set extends from October 29, 
1993 through December 31, 2002 (with underwriting data from 1987 on), and contains 173,950 
recommendations with linked trading data, for 2424 securities of 2397 firms. Notice that only 
12% of the firms in our NYSE sample lack recommendations, so that our final sample contains 
almost the entire set of domestic NYSE firms with common stock. 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
1. Analyst Recommendations 
We first analyze the distribution of recommendations (from “strong sell” to “strong buy”) among 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. We display the sample statistics for the entire sample period 
of October 1993 through December 2002, to characterize the full sample and to highlight   16
differences in behavior after the increased media attention from 2001 on. As Table II shows, 
analysts make very few strong sell and sell recommendations (4.58%), regardless of their 
affiliation. If investors were to take analyst recommendations literally, they would constantly be 
purchasing securities. The strikingly left-skewed distribution is consistent with analysts’ 
incentive to issue buy recommendations rather than sell recommendations in order to maximize 
the resulting amount of trading business or to remain in favor with firm managers. 
Table II also displays the distribution of recommendations for each type of underwriting 
affiliation. As in previous literature, “IPO lead underwriting” affiliation indicates that the 
analyst’s investment bank was the lead underwriter of an IPO in the past 5 years. If the 
investment bank underwrote an SEO in the past 2 years, the analyst is “SEO lead underwriting” 
affiliated. “Co-underwriting” affiliation is defined for the same periods. In addition, we consider 
future equity underwriting for the next two years and bond underwriting for the past year.
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Including all affiliation categories, there are a total of 11,017 affiliated recommendations, about 
9.1% of the total recommendation sample, which contains 121,130 recommendations. 
The summary statistics show that analysts with any type of affiliation issue more positive 
recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. The average recommendation level in all of the 
affiliated groups lies around 4.00 or higher, that is, their average recommendation is at least a 
“buy.” Unaffiliated analysts, on the other hand, have average recommendations of 3.76. The 
difference to the average level of affiliated recommendations is statistically significant. (In an 
OLS regression of recommendation level on a constant and an indicator for analyst affiliation, 
the coefficient on affiliation is 0.2515, with a standard error of 0.0103.) Likewise, the mode is 
“buy” for affiliated analysts while it is “hold” for unaffiliated analysts. The distortion is largest 
for future underwriting affiliation, with buy and strong buy recommendations amounting to more 
than 85%. Note that these differences do not arise from quicker updating of affiliated analysts. 
As shown in Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2004), affiliated analysts update their 
recommendation on a given stock more slowly than unaffiliated analysts, every 357 days instead 
of 308 days for unaffiliated analysts for the sample analyzed in this paper. Moreover, the 
difference is entirely driven by positive recommendations. While affiliated analysts are faster to   17
update negative and hold recommendations, they preserve their positive recommendations about 
70 days longer than unaffiliated analysts. 
We find similar differences for negative recommendations. Unaffiliated analysts make 
very few sell and strong sell recommendations, but affiliated analysts make even fewer. 
Combining all of the possible affiliations, for the entire sample of over 2500 stocks for over ten 
years, affiliated analysts issued fewer than 250 sell and strong sell recommendations. The 
extremely low number becomes even more remarkable when we examine the timing of these 
recommendations. The few sell and strong sell recommendations made by affiliated analysts are 
almost exclusively from 2002. For example, for our whole sample, analysts with IPO and SEO 
lead and co-underwriter affiliation issue a total of 154 sell and strong sell recommendations. Out 
of the 154 negative recommendations, 69 are from 2002. Twenty-two of those recommendations 
were made by analysts from Morgan Stanley, as the firm worked on improving their analysts’ 
reputation and on moderating the effect of the SEC investigation of their analysts’ conflicts of 
interest. For the entire sample period affiliated recommendations are significantly higher than 
unaffiliated recommendations, but if we limit the sample to 1993-2001, the difference is even 
stronger.  
We also consider independent brokerage firms separately, where we define firms as 
“independent” or “never affiliated” if they do not underwrite any securities during our SDC 
sample period of 1987 through 2002. Analysts of independent firms make the most strong-sell 
and sell recommendations, and their average recommendation is significantly lower than the 
average recommendation of unaffiliated brokerage firms in general (the difference is -0.0805, 
with a standard error of 0.0118), or any other group of affiliated brokerage firms specifically (the 
difference to all affiliated analysts is 0.3102, with a standard error of 0.0157). 
Finally, we address the possibility that positive recommendations made by affiliated 
analysts are caused by differences in the firms being covered. Companies that have recently 
issued securities may be truly of higher quality, as evidenced by their ability to access the capital 
markets. We thus examine the sample statistics and average recommendations restricting our 
sample to recommendations of firms that have recently issued  stocks or bonds. Panel B of   18
Table II shows that the statistics are virtually identical and that the higher recommendations of 
affiliated analysts are thus not due to characteristics of firms that have issued new securities. 
Further evidence that the differences do not arise from differences in the firms being 
covered is presented in Appendix Table 1. A detailed look at the NAIC industries covered by 
each group shows that there are barely any differences. In fact, the portion of recommendations 
falling into any of the NAIC industry groups differs by less than one percentage point for all but 
three groups. 
To summarize the insights from the analysis of the recommendations data, we find 
evidence that analyst recommendations display two types of distortions. First, more than 95% of 
all recommendations are positive or neutral. Second, analysts with underwriting affiliations tend 
to issue even more positive recommendations. 
2. Returns 
Before we turn to the core of our empirical analysis, we briefly show that investors make losses 
if they follow analyst recommendations “literally.” Previous literature indicates that investors 
cannot naively follow analyst recommendations in order to earn positive portfolio returns 
[Barber et al., 2001; Jegadeesh et al., 2004]. Moreover, stocks recommended by affiliated 
analysts perform significantly worse than those recommended by unaffiliated analysts [Michaely 
and Womack 1999; Lin and McNichols 1998; Iskoz 2002]. These results have been shown for 
various measures of abnormal returns, such as the market-model abnormal buy-hold returns and 
Fama-French portfolio returns. 
We briefly replicate those results with our data in order to demonstrate the potential 
welfare affects of the two types of distortion laid out above. We show that it is not profitable to 
take analyst recommendations at face value and to buy in response to buy and strong buy 
recommendations, to hold after hold recommendations, and to sell after sell and strong sell 
recommendations, in particular in the case of affiliated recommendations.   19
Describing our primary portfolio method, we construct two different portfolios. In one, 
the recommendations of all affiliated analysts are followed, that is, stock is purchased for a buy 
or strong-buy recommendation, and sold for a sell or strong-sell recommendation of any 
affiliated analyst. In the second portfolio, the same is done for the recommendations of 
unaffiliated analysts. We then examine both the buy-and-hold returns and the cumulative 
abnormal returns of these portfolios over many different time horizons. The investment strategy 
of a naive (small) investor is likely to correspond to some convex combination of the two 
portfolios. 
We calculate both the raw returns and the abnormal returns using the market model. For 
the abnormal returns, we form event-time portfolios based on recommendations and estimate the 
relation of event-time portfolio and market portfolio over the one-year period ending two months 
before the event as follows: 
(4)        it mt i i it R R ε β α + + =      
where Ri,t is the return of portfolio i on day t, and Rm,t is the return of the market portfolio on day 
t. We then use the estimated values of all α i and β i to calculate the abnormal return during and 
after the event period. The abnormal return is the difference between the realized portfolio return 
and the predicted return based on the estimated parameters and the realized market returns. 
(5)      ( ) mt i i it it R R AR β α ˆ ˆ + − =  
We evaluate buy-and-hold returns over a number of horizons. Table III displays the 
returns over three months following the analyst recommendation date, six months, the first, 
second and third year (in addition to the pre-even returns from day –10 to –2 and the even returns 
over the three-day window from –1 to +1). Since the analyst issuing a recommendation is likely 
to be evaluated during the same year, the performance over the next six months to one year is 
probably most relevant. On the other hand, small investors may not re-evaluate their positions for 
some years. Thus, longer horizons are also of interest from the perspective of the investors. 
Panel A of Table III presents the abnormal returns for the portfolio strategy described 
above separately for recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. We find that both 
portfolios significantly underperform relative to the market over any post-event horizon   20
considered. Using the value-weighted market index, the underperformance amounts to 17.8% for 
the stocks recommended by affiliated analysts and to 4.5% for stocks recommended by 
unaffiliated analysts over one year. The results are similar for equal weighting (21.4% and 7.5% 
underperformance for year one). We also find that the portfolio following recommendations of 
affiliated analysts underperforms relative to those recommended by unaffiliated analysts. Over 
the one-year horizon, the abnormal returns of affiliated recommendations are more than 13% 
lower. Note that these numbers are virtually identical to those in Michaely and Womack [1999]. 
We also distinguish between upgrades and downgrades since a given recommendation 
level may have different informational content, depending on the direction of change from the 
previous level. As the middle part of Panel A shows, we find the same pattern of 
underperformance of portfolios following affiliated and unaffiliated analyst recommendations as 
well as underperformance of the affiliated relative to the unaffiliated recommendations. The 
partition also reveals that the underperformance of the portfolio following affiliated 
recommendations is significantly stronger for upgrades. For example, over the one-year horizon, 
a portfolio buying and selling in stocks upgraded by an affiliated analyst actually performs worse 
by more than 8.5 percentage points relative to a portfolio buying and selling stocks downgraded 
by an affiliated analyst. This pattern is less strong for unaffiliated analysts and other intervals. 
Finally, we address the concern that the underperformance of affiliated recommendations 
relative to unaffiliated recommendations may be driven by long-run underperformance of IPOs 
and SEOs. In the bottom part of Panel A, we recalculate returns for the subsample of firms that 
have issued stock in an IPO during the last five years or an SEO during the last two years at the 
time of a recommendation. Rather than comparing returns to a market index, we display a 
benchmark portfolio that invests in all stocks at issuance. For horizons up to one year, the picture 
remains the same: Both portfolios generate lower raw returns than the benchmark, for example 
11.5% for affiliated recommendations, 13.8% for unaffiliated recommendations, and 15.8% for 
the IPO/SEO benchmark sample over the one-year horizon. The difference is statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) for the affiliated portfolio. (The difference to the unaffiliated 
portfolio is significant over shorter horizons, e.g. six months). The results suggest that an   21
investor who wants to trade securities of recent equity issuers would do better simply buying 
indiscriminately than following analyst recommendations and in particular affiliated analyst 
recommendations, despite the additional information we might expect an affiliated analyst to 
have. 
The abnormal returns are virtually the same if we consider portfolio strategies that 
account for short-selling constraints and are constructed by buying in case of buy and strong buy 
recommendations and holding the stock for the various periods considered above. 
In addition to the event-study methodology, we estimate daily abnormal portfolio returns 
using a Fama-French three-factor model (Panel B of Table III). We calculate the time-series of 
daily excess returns of zero-investment portfolios with a buy-and-hold horizon of one year.  The 
buy portfolio consists of all stocks with at least one buy- or strong-buy recommendation in the 
last year, the sell portfolio consists of all stocks with at least one sell- or strong-sell 
recommendation in the last year.  Portfolio returns are value-weighted by market capitalization. 
(The results with equal weighting are virtually identical.)  If the sell-portfolio is empty we 
substitute with the risk-free rate. 
The portfolio of all stocks that are recommended only by affiliated analysts earns 
negative abnormal returns of 0.24% per day. The abnormal returns of the portfolio investing in 
all stocks that are recommended only by unaffiliated analysts are negative and insignificant. If 
we restrict the analysis only to buy recommendations (to account for short-sell constraints), we 
find a negative alpha both for the portfolio of affiliated recommendations and the portfolio of 
unaffiliated recommendations. While the affiliated portfolio has a lower alpha, the difference is 
not significant.  If we consider more sophisticated portfolio strategies (such as buying only 
stocks with strong-buy recommendations and selling stocks with hold, sell, or strong-sell 
recommendations), the alpha of the unaffiliated portfolio becomes zero and that of the affiliated 
portfolio small and insignificantly negative. Thus, portfolios naively following analyst 
recommendations seem to earn negative returns beyond the three Fama-French factors, in 
particular for affiliated analysts.   22
Thus, a “naïve” portfolio strategy that takes analyst recommendations literally leads to 
significant underperformance, in particular if it follows affiliated analysts. It is worth stressing 
that the negative abnormal returns to both affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations are due to 
the simple portfolio formation. As Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman [2001] have shown, 
more sophisticated strategies allow to “profit from the prophets,” in particular short selling the 
least-recommended stocks.  In our sample, for example buying only strong buy 
recommendations and selling buy, hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations leads to 
considerably less underperformance. The abnormal returns are -3.92% (value-weighted index) 
and -2.44% (equal-weighted index) for the portfolio following affiliated analyst 
recommendations and -2.51% (value-weighted) and -0.70% (equal-weighted) following 
unaffiliated recommendations. As we will see below, however, it is in particular the literal 
interpretation of analyst recommendations, which is of interest in the context of trade reactions. 
3. Trade Reaction 
The incentives faced by analysts seem to have an effect on their recommendations. Overall, 
analysts almost never recommend selling a stock. Underwriting-affiliated analysts issue even 
more positive recommendations than unaffiliated analysts, and consistently issue more buy and 
strong buy recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. The primary question of this section is 
whether investors account for these distortions in their trading decisions. 
We apply the different measures of trade reaction, developed in Section II.4, to identify 
the buy or sell reaction triggered by recommendations. Table IV presents summary statistics for 
our trading measures. Panel A shows that small investors execute about nine more buy-initiated 
trades and sell-initiated trades per day than large investors. The average differences between 
buy- and sell-initiated trades, however, are very similar, 3.18 for small trades and 3.43 for large 
trades. The median is 0 for both small and large trades. 
To test the trade reactions to recommendations, we employ the methodology of event 
studies. Trading days 0 and 1 around the event are our primary event period, where day 0 is the   23
first trading day at or after recommendation issuance. The summary statistics for trading 
behavior during these event days, presented in Panel B, show that the difference between buys 
and sells is considerably higher, both for small and large trades on the days of recommendations 
(19.26 for small trades and 18.92 for large trades over the two event days), indicating systematic 
buy-pressure induced by the recommendations. The trade imbalance for large traders is slightly 
negative on these days, indicating that they initiate a larger portion of their buy orders than of 
their sell orders on high-volume days. 
Our core results are presented in Table V. We regress the normalized trade imbalance on 
dummies for all recommendation levels and their interactions with a dummy variable for 
affiliation. This regression framework allows us to investigate the investor reaction to both types 
of analyst distortions, analysts’ general tendency to issue mostly positive recommendations and 
the additional distortion of underwriting-affiliated analysts relative to their unaffiliated peers. 
The first three columns show the trade reaction of large investors, of small investors, and the 
difference between the two investor classes for all recommendations of unaffiliated analysts in 
the upper part and the differential reaction to recommendations of affiliated analysts in the lower 
part of Table V. For unaffiliated analysts, we find that large investors’ imbalance is significantly 
positive for strong buy recommendations, zero (insignificantly positive) for buy 
recommendations and significantly negative for hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations. 
Small investors, instead, display significantly positive reaction to both buy and strong buy 
recommendations from unaffiliated analysts and zero trade reaction to unaffiliated hold 
recommendations. They display negative abnormal trading behavior only in response to sell and 
strong sell recommendations. 
The implications of these baseline results are two-fold. First, the pattern of significant 
abnormal trade imbalances suggests that recommendations have a significant impact on the 
trading behavior of both large and small investors. Second, the results imply that large traders 
account for the general upward bias by shifting recommendations down by one level while small 
traders take the recommendations literally.   24
The bottom part of Table V shows the differential reaction of large and small investors to 
the recommendations of affiliated analysts. Large investors significantly reduce their positive or 
neutral trade imbalance after strong buy or buy recommendations if the analyst is affiliated. The 
differential reaction to hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations is insignificant, implying that, 
as with unaffiliated recommendations, they react negatively. Small investors, on the other hand, 
do not display any significant difference in trading behavior for strong buy, buy, hold or sell 
recommendations. They react more negatively to affiliated strong sell recommendations. 
These results indicate that large traders apply an additional downward adjustment to 
positive recommendations if the analyst is affiliated. Small investors, instead, fail to adjust for 
affiliation and take both affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations literally. For affiliated sell 
and strong sell recommendations, we also observe the predicted difference in trade imbalance of 
large and small investors. For example, large investors do not display significant additional sell 
pressure after a sell recommendation if it is affiliated (the negative coefficient of -0.195 is 
insignificant), but small traders do. Taking affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations together, 
the strong negative reaction of small investors to sell and strong sell recommendations is 
consistent with their preceding neutral reaction to hold recommendations, as outlined in 
Section  II.2. Large investors, instead, have already reacted negatively to preceding hold 
recommendations.  In fact, the mean number of hold recommendations in the month preceding a 
recommendation is 0.5989 for the full sample, but 0.8722 for sell recommendations and 1.0126 
for strong sell recommendations. The results suggest that large investors incorporate the negative 
news earlier, when the hold recommendation is issued, while small investors do so only at 
issuance of a sell or strong sell recommendation. It is also consistent with small-investor naiveté 
that the difference in trading behavior is stronger for affiliated sell and strong sell 
recommendations since most of the large-traders’ negative reaction happens “even earlier” for 
affiliated than unaffiliated recommendations while small investors do not distinguish between 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Note, though, that a simple theory of naiveté does not predict 
that the coefficient of small investors’ trade reaction is more negative for affiliated strong sells 
than for unaffiliated strong sells (-0.838 versus -0.105). Interpreting this specific result, however,   25
is difficult due to the small sample size. There are only 27 affiliated strong sell 
recommendations, suggesting that they arise only under unusual circumstances.
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Using the normalized trade imbalance as our dependent variable also allows us to 
compare the magnitude of trade reactions across investor groups. The coefficients for large and 
small investors’ trade reaction indicate that small traders react much more strongly to positive 
recommendations than large traders do. While the negative trade imbalances following 
unaffiliated sell and strong sell recommendations are similar in magnitude for both types of 
investors, the positive reaction to unaffiliated strong buy recommendations is about two times 
larger for small than for large investors. The trade reaction to buy recommendations is about ten 
times as large. Small investors thus appear to condition their trading decisions on 
recommendations to a larger extent than large investors. The weaker reaction of large investors 
to positive recommendations may either be due to the higher baseline information of large 
traders (i.e. their trades are more spread out), or it may result from additional discounting for the 
upward recommendation bias. 
Both the failure to adjust for the general upwards bias in recommendations and the failure 
to adjust for additional upwards distortion due to affiliation is consistent with small-investor 
naiveté. The behavior of large investors, on the other hand, appears to reflect fully rational 
behavior. 
Reaction to Upgrades and Downgrades. The discussion so far focused on the level of a 
recommendation. As the discussion of small investors’ over- and under-reaction revealed, 
another important consideration is the previous level of recommendation. To identify the role of 
upgrades and downgrades, we re-do the previous analysis on the subsample of upgrades and the 
subsample of downgrades in Columns 4 to 9 of Table V. Notice that the category of affiliated 
sell recommendations within upgrades disappears due to lack of data – there are only two 
observations in this category.   26
For recommendations of unaffiliated analysts, we find that the negative trade reaction of 
large investors to sell recommendations is significant both for upgrades and for downgrades. 
Regardless of whether the previous recommendation level was higher or lower, large investors 
recognize the negative news conveyed in a sell recommendation. The negative reaction to hold 
recommendations, on the other hand, is mostly driven by downgrades. The coefficient on hold 
recommendation for downgrades (-0.15) is almost ten times the coefficient on the hold dummy 
for upgrades (-0.016), and only the downgrades coefficient is statistically significant. This means 
that an upgrade from sell or strong sell to hold is not enough good news to reverse the previous 
sell reaction; a downgrade from buy or strong buy, however, is interpreted as bad news about the 
stock. Also the coefficient on the buy recommendations dummy differs between the upgrades 
and the downgrades sample. It is significantly positive for upgrades and significantly negative 
for downgrades. In other words, large investors evaluate a buy recommendation relative to the 
previous level of recommendation. 
Small investors, on the other hand, distinguish much less between upgrades and 
downgrades. They buy after buy recommendations, hold after hold recommendations, and sell 
after sell recommendations, regardless of the direction of change.
22 Small traders react more 
positively to a hold, buy or strong buy recommendation than large traders, whether that 
recommendation is an upgrade or downgrade. The difference is highly significant for all 
categories other than the upgrade-hold recommendation.  However, the trade reaction is more 
positive for upgrades than for downgrades. 
The estimates of the differential reaction to upgrades and downgrades of affiliated 
analysts are much less precisely estimated on the subsamples and are mostly insignificant. Both 
the size of the coefficients and the (relatively smaller) standard errors reveal, however, that 
reactions to recommendation upgrades are driving the “affiliation neglect” of small traders. 
Large traders react more negatively when an affiliated analyst issues an upgrade hold, buy or 
strong buy, while small traders react more positively. The difference between the small and large 
investors’ trade corrections for affiliation is significant for each of the three upgrade 
recommendation categories.   27
Relationship Between Trading and Returns.  Our results on trade reaction and the earlier results 
on portfolio returns suggest that small traders lose money relative to large traders. In Table VI, 
we provide more direct evidence of the loss induced by trading behavior that does not account 
for the distortions of analysts. We calculate the buy-and-hold returns over a three-month horizon, 
a six-month horizon, and a one-year horizon after each recommendation. We then regress these 
post-event returns on the net value of buy- minus sell-initiated trades of small and large investors 
for each recommendation (on event days 0 and 1) and on a constant. 
For small investors, we find a significantly negative relation between net trades and 
returns over any horizon. Accounting for the positive constant, the net effect is still negative at 
any positive amount of net trades. For large traders, instead, the coefficient on trade imbalance is 
minimal, at about 0.4% to 0.5% of the coefficient for small trades (while the coefficient on the 
constant remains about the same). It is insignificant over the one-year horizon. In fact, for any 
net trade value up to about $7m for the one-year horizon and for up to $8.2m for the three-month 
horizon, large investors earn positive returns on their trades. (The average net trade size is $5m 
for large traders.) 
In addition to the raw return results displayed, we repeated the test using the various 
return and trade measures previously employed in this paper. We consistently find that there is a 
negative relationship between future returns and event-time net trading, whether measured in 
dollars or number of trades.  We also calculate the return earned per dollar traded for both small 
and large trades, for the three-month, six-month and 1-year horizons.  The returns to large trades 
are significantly higher than the returns to small trades, using both raw returns and various 
abnormal return measures.  The difference is 4-5% per year for raw returns and market-adjusted 
returns, and is over 10% for market model abnormal returns. 
4. Robustness 
Panel A of Table VII re-estimates the standard errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity, with 
arbitrary within-year correlation and arbitrary within-brokerage firm correlation. Our results are 
robust to these alternative assumptions. For large investors, we find both the rational downward   28
adjustment in response to unaffiliated recommendations (e.g. significant abnormal sell reaction 
to hold recommendations) and the additional discounting of positive affiliated recommendations. 
Only the downward adjustment to affiliated buy recommendations is not significant in this 
variation. As for the small investors, we find again significant abnormal trade reaction in the 
direction suggested by a literal (unadjusted) interpretation of recommendations and no 
significant difference between their reaction to affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations (as 
before with the exception of strong sells). Similarly, including year- or brokerage fixed effects in 
the regressions does not affect our results. 
We also check the robustness of our results to variations in the cutoff values for 
distinguishing “small” from “large” trades. Panel B of Table VII shows the trade reaction for 
four subgroups of trades below $50,000, namely trades of at most $5,000, trades between $5,000 
and $10,000, trades between $10,000 and $20,000, and trades between $20,000 and $50,000. 
(The cutoff value mainly employed in the paper aggregates the first three groups.) Both sets of 
results, the “literal” reaction to any recommendations and failure to account for additional 
distortion of affiliated recommendations replicate in almost all cells. In fact, the puzzling 
differential trade reaction to affiliated strong sell recommendations loses significance for two 
groups (below $5,000 and $10,000-$20,000). On the other hand also the negative abnormal trade 
reaction to negative unaffiliated recommendations disappears or loses significance for two 
subgroups (below $5,000 and $20,000-$50,000). Overall, both results show remarkable 
robustness within each of these small subgroups. 
In addition, the results are similar if we employ the raw number of buy-initiated trades 
minus the number of sell-initiated trades or the trade imbalance without normalization over the 
event period. Also, longer horizons (up to 20 trading days after the recommendation) lead to 
similar results, indicating that small traders continue reacting to recommendations over some 
time period. 
As a final robustness check, we split “affiliation” into its component parts, including the 
additional definitions of possible affiliation, such as future underwriting and bond underwriting.    29
We also include whether the firm has recently issued a security and whether the underwriter is 
independent. We limit the sample to firms that have at least some institutional ownership at the 
quarter-end before the recommendation, using several different cutoffs.  We repeat the regression 
for each year in the sample, and for various other sub-samples.  With all of these variations, the 
two general results remain.  First, small traders react more positively in general to hold, buy and 
strong buy recommendations than large traders.  Second, small traders fail to correct for 
underwriter affiliation to the extent that large traders correct for it. 
5. Alternative Explanations 
Limited Information. Compared to institutional investors, individuals are likely to face higher 
informational costs to identify analysts as affiliated. Their limited access to information about 
analyst affiliation may generate (and certainly contributes to) the failure of small investors to 
differentiate between recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. For example, small 
traders may decide to follow analyst recommendations regardless of affiliation, since the 
probability of randomly hitting an unaffiliated recommendation is high enough to compensate for 
the added risk of hitting an affiliated recommendation. 
Informational constraints, however, cannot explain our first result. If investors were just 
lacking information about analyst affiliation, but fully rational about analyst incentives, their 
average reaction to positive recommendations should still take the upward bias among all 
analysts into account. Given that small investors follow recommendations (as evidenced by their 
abnormal trade reaction) and given that 95% of these recommendations are positive or neutral, 
small investors should be aware of the general upward distortion and discount appropriately. We 
find, however, that small investors fail to do so and react more positively to recommendations 
than large investors. In particular, while large investors sell in response to hold 
recommendations, small investors do not. And while large investors do not display any abnormal 
trade reaction after buy recommendations, small investors exhibit abnormal buy pressure. 
Additional empirical results suggest that even the indiscriminate trade reaction after 
affiliated and unaffiliated analyst recommendations is at least partly due to naiveté. Investors for   30
whom it is costly to find out about analysts’ affiliation but who are aware of the incentive effects 
can benefit from focusing on analysts who are “visibly” unaffiliated, because their financial 
institution is never involved in any underwriting and may not even have any associated corporate 
finance department. Such information is easier to collect and often advertised by unaffiliated 
brokerage firms. More generally, it is less costly for investors to get a broad impression of which 
brokers underwrite heavily and which rarely underwrite than to identify every single underwriter 
relationship. We thus analyze the differential trade reaction of small investors to firms in our 
sample that never underwrite during our sample period (starting in 1987). Of the 382 brokerage 
firms that issue recommendations for the firms in our sample, 105 (27%) do not have a single 
match to an SDC underwriter firm who was either the lead or co-underwriter on an equity issue 
for a US firm from 1987 on. These brokers issue about 5% of the recommendations in our 
sample. As shown earlier, the recommendations of these analysts are less upward-biased than 
any other subsample of affiliated or unaffiliated analysts (Table II).  As a result, the 
recommendations of never affiliated analysts are significantly less (if at all) underperforming. 
For example, in the market model with value-weighted index, the portfolio strategy of buying 
any buy- or strong-buy-recommended stock and holding it for one year leads to abnormal returns 
-0.20% (from trading day 2 to 255) rather than -18.21% for the buy and strong-buy 
recommendations of affiliated analysts and -3.70% for those of all unaffiliated analysts.  The net 
performance from trading day -1 to day +255 is positive (0.34% from trading day -1 to +1). 
Nevertheless, as shown in the first column of Table VIII, small investors react 
significantly less to buy and strong buy recommendations of never-affiliated analysts than to the 
average (affiliated or non-affiliated) recommendation, with t-statistics of -1.7 for the interaction 
with the buy dummy and -1.8 for the interaction with the strong buy dummy. The differential 
reaction to a hold, sell, and strong sell recommendation issued by a never-affiliated analyst is 
insignificant. We also account for the possibility that these firms are simply not “on the radar 
screen” of small investors because they are too small. Specifically, we gather data on annual 
sales and number of employees from D&B’s Million Dollar Database. We match this data to our 
underwriting brokers, and use it to control for brokerage firm size. The matched data set is   31
considerably smaller, only about 5% of the data set used in the baseline regressions (in Table V). 
Despite the considerably reduced sample size, we find that our findings are robust to limiting the 
sample to the largest 50% of firms for which we have sales data or employee count data. As 
shown in the second and third columns of Table VIII, the results remain significant for strong 
buy recommendations, and the coefficients become even more negative for both buy and strong 
buy. 
Overall, these results suggest that informational constraints do not only fail to explain 
small investors’ general inability to adjust their interpretation of recommendations but also fail to 
fully explain the lack of adjustment for affiliation. 
Analyst Quality.  One difficulty in analyzing data on analyst recommendations is the lack of an 
objective quality measure for recommendations. Our results that naive portfolio strategies, which 
mirror the trade reaction of small investors, induce losses, leave room for two interpretations.  
Either the lower returns result from small investors’ inability to account for analysts’ incentives 
to distort information. Or investors happen to follow over-proportionally the recommendations of 
lower-quality analysts. In order to distinguish investor naiveté from analyst quality, we repeat the 
regression analysis of trade reaction on two subsamples. First, we restrict the analysis to analysts 
who are classified both as affiliated and as unaffiliated at different points during the sample 
period (“Ever-Affiliated Analysts”). Second, we restrict the analysis to analysts who were listed 
in Institutional Investor Magazine’s most recent October list of top analysts (“All Star Team”).
23 
In both cases we reduce the heterogeneity in recommendations due to analyst characteristics. 
The results are shown in Table IX. As in the baseline regressions in Table V, we find that 
large traders display negative trade reaction to hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations, no 
significant reaction to buy recommendations, and positive reaction to strong buy 
recommendations of unaffiliated analysts. Moreover, large traders adjust their trade reactions to 
strong buy recommendations downwards if the analyst is affiliated. For all other 
recommendation levels, the differential reaction is insignificant. We also replicate the result that 
small traders take analyst recommendations “literally” and sell after sell and strong sell   32
recommendations, hold after hold recommendations, and buy after buy and strong buy 
recommendations of unaffiliated analysts. (For the smaller sample of All Star Analysts the sell 
reaction loses significance.) As in the baseline regressions, small traders also display additional 
sell pressure for the (very small number of) strong sell recommendations issued by affiliated 
analysts, and they display no differential reaction to the sell, hold, and buy recommendations of 
affiliated analysts. The differential reaction to strong buy recommendations of affiliated analysts 
is negative; however the net trade reaction of small investors to affiliated strong buy 
recommendations is still strongly positive (differently from the zero reaction of large investors). 
In summary, our two main results replicate both on the Ever-Affiliated subsample and on 
the All-Star subsample. These additional findings make it unlikely that analyst heterogeneity 
(beyond affiliation) and adverse sorting of small investors generate our results. 
Brokerage Firm Heterogeneity.  Similar concerns about recommendation quality may apply on 
the firm level. While the above analysis rules out that small investors follow worse analysts, they 
may still only be aware of a subset of widely published recommendations. Small investors too 
positive reaction to recommendations in general and to affiliated recommendations in particular 
may be capturing their stronger reaction to recommendations of certain (large) brokerage firms. 
To account for heterogeneity of brokerage firms, we turn again to the subsample of firms with 
matched sales or employee data and included these characteristics in the regression. We allow 
the same degree of non-linearity and interact sales/employees with all levels of 
recommendations. As pointed out above, the matched data set is considerably smaller. We thus 
first replicated our baseline results on the subsample (first three columns of Table X). The results 
are weaker for the subsample, but the coefficients maintain the same signs and almost the same 
magnitudes as for the full sample. We include controls of every level of recommendation 
interacted with the size proxy. As shown in columns 4 to 9, the additional controls do not 
diminish the results any further. In fact, including the controls improves the results for the 
subsample.   33
Relationship Between Trading Size and Affiliation.  An additional concern is that our empirical 
findings may be due to systematic changes in trading size in response to affiliation.  In particular, 
it is conceivable that investors trade smaller amounts in response to affiliated buy 
recommendations than in response to unaffiliated buy recommendations. The resulting 
(re-)classification of large investors as small may generate the weaker trade reaction of large 
traders to affiliated recommendations.  An immediate weakness of this alternative explanation is 
that variations in trade size cannot explain our first result, i.e. that small investors do not discount 
analyst recommendations on average.  Moreover, two additional results address this concern 
directly. 
  First, systematic shifts in trade size, which are large enough to move investors normally 
trading above $50,000 into the class of investors trading below $20,000, should be reflected in 
the remaining class of large trades.  For example, a uniform shift would reduce the average size 
of the remaining large trades above $50,000 by at least $30,000.  We find, however, that the 
average size of trades above $50,000 changes by less than 3.5% between unaffiliated to affiliated 
recommendations. The average large trade is $217,244 in response to unaffiliated 
recommendations and $209,836 in response to affiliated recommendations. It seems unlikely that 
for a significant portion of investors with trades of more than $50,000 in response to unaffiliated 
recommendations trade for less than $20,000 in response to affiliated recommendations, and so 
any inaccuracies in our cutoffs are more likely to introduce noise than bias. 
Second, in order to explain the more negative reaction of large traders in response to 
affiliated recommendations, it does not suffice for all traders to reduce their trade size to generate 
changes in trade imbalance. Rather, the relative portion of buy-initiators has to go down among 
traders classified as large. In other words, an abnormally high portion of those large investors 
who are particularly keen to buy the recommended stock has to reduce their trade size enough to 
drop out of the large-investor category and potentially join the small-investor category. This is 
not the case. Buy-initiated large trades change on average by 3.9% and sell-initiated large trades 
by 2.5%, i.e. both changes are small and similar.   34
Front Running.  Large traders may learn either of the recommendation itself, or the information 
that sparks the new recommendation, earlier than small traders. As a result, their main trade 
reaction may take place earlier and they may display either no or a contrarian trade reaction at 
the time of the recommendation. 
The informational advantage of larger traders is likely to explain why large traders 
display less of an abnormal trade reaction to recommendations in general, for instance as 
measured by the normalized trade imbalance in Table V. The coefficients are typically much 
smaller for large investors’ trade reaction for the trade reaction of small investors. Our results, 
however, do not only indicate that large investors react “relatively less” but also that they adjust 
their reaction downwards as schematized in Figure 2. Rather than display a weaker but 
directionally unaffected trade reaction or a contrarian trade reaction, large investors “hold” in 
response to buy recommendations and “sell” in response to hold recommendations but follow 
strong buy, sell, and strong sell recommendations literally. 
Moreover, it is hard to detect any front running by large investors in the data. Table XI 
presents the trading volume in the month preceding a recommendation until one day after the 
recommendation. We find that both small and large trades peak on the day of the 
recommendation and not before. This result holds regardless of whether trading volume is 
measured in transaction dollars or number of trades. In addition, the increase in trading volume 
from 20 trading days before the recommendation until the day of the recommendation is 
relatively stronger for large investors (29% in number of trades, 51% in dollar volume) than for 
small investors (11% and 16%). In addition, we re-analyzed the relation between 
recommendation and trade imbalance for the week preceding the recommendation (days -5 to -1) 
as in Table V.
24 None of the coefficients would imply any anticipatory trades among large 
traders.  Quite to the opposite, large traders exhibit a significant buy-imbalance for “downgrade 
buys,” i.e. stocks that are currently strong buys but will be downgraded to buy within the next 
five trading days, while they exhibit a significant sell-imbalance once the downgrade occurs.  
Similarly, large traders exert insignificant negative pressure before the upgrade to a strong buy,   35
but significant buying pressure upon the issuance of the recommendation.  These results remain 
unchanged when we include a larger event window. 
V. Market Response 
Consumer biases affect not only consumption decisions, but also market organization. Profit-
maximizing firms have incentives to tailor their product design and information provision to take 
advantage of consumers’ systematic deviations from optimal decision-making. In the case of 
stock market recommendations, it is profitable for investment banks to entertain a brokerage 
branch issuing distorted investment advice and, in particular, to unify brokerage and corporate 
finance under one roof since investors systematically neglect analyst distortions. 
How stable is the interaction between biased consumers and rational firms? Specifically, 
can we identify circumstances under which firms would cease issuing distorted 
recommendations? Or, could individual investors learn to account for the distortions? These 
questions are of particular relevance from a policy perspective. Our return results imply that 
consumer naiveté and firm response affect negatively the welfare of consumers. If the policy-
maker is concerned about small investors, the question is how to optimally remedy this effect. 
Our data allows us to shed light on two aspects of these questions. First, we can exploit 
variation in coverage of stocks and ask whether increased coverage reduces the distortion of 
recommendations. The more analysts are covering the same stock, the more each of them is 
competing for the attention of investors. Do analysts compete for clients by providing more 
accurate recommendations? Given that, almost always, the affiliated brokerages are covering the 
stock, increased competition implies an increased number of non-affiliated analysts. Since 
unaffiliated analysts tend to bias their recommendations less, one may expect that competition 
will also moderate the distortion in affiliated recommendations. The empirical variation in 
coverage reflects, of course, heterogeneity of the covered stocks, both in the cross-section and 
over time, such as market capitalization, recent and long-term performance, volatility, ownership 
structure (broad or narrow). We do not have a clean natural experiment that varies coverage for   36
exogenous reasons. However, if stocks that attract more analyst coverage also received less 
distorted recommendations, there would be potential for increased competition to alleviate the 
adverse welfare effects of naiveté for small investors.  Such a result would leave room for the 
hypothesis that less intrusive policy measures such as removing barriers to entry and competitive 
disadvantages for unaffiliated analysts (as, for example, intended with Regulation FD) may be 
sufficient. 
To analyze the effect of increased coverage on the distortion of recommendation levels 
we calculate for each recommendation the difference between the recommendation and the 
consensus (average recommendation level) over the last month as well as the number of analysts 
who have made a recommendation on the same stock in the past month. The summary statistics 
are in Panel A of Table XII. We then relate the “deviation” from the consensus to affiliation and 
to the number of analysts covering the stock. Columns 1 and 3 of Panel B show that, as expected, 
affiliated recommendations tend to lie above the average recommendation, recommendations of 
independent analysts below.  Increased coverage, however, does not mitigate the effect.  The 
number of analysts enters insignificantly.  Moreover, the opposite appears to be the case for 
affiliated analysts.  As shown in Column (2), the interaction of the affiliation dummy and the 
number of analysts is positive and significant.  Column (4) shows that SEO lead-underwriter 
affiliation appears to contribute most to the upward bias, though the effect is not precisely 
estimated.  While the mechanism behind the correlation of higher coverage and more upward 
bias of affiliated analysts cannot be deduced from this regression, the results are a first indication 
that competition may not remedy informational distortion among analysts. 
The reaction of small investors to these recommendations is consistent with competition 
failing to influence affiliated analysts towards more accurate recommendations. In untabulated 
regressions, we compare the trade reactions for the quartile of recommendations with the highest 
number of other analysts with reactions to the quartile with the lowest number.  We find that the 
small traders react slightly more positively to affiliated buy and strong buy recommendations, 
relative to unaffiliated positive recommendations, when the competition is highest.   37
A second aspect of the dynamic market interaction between rational firms and biased 
consumers, on which the data allows to shed some light, is the ability of small investors to learn.  
While the data is insufficient to examine individual learning over time, we analyze the trade 
reaction of the class of small investors as a whole. As mentioned before, our baseline results 
replicate for every single year between 1994 and 2001 and do not display a clear trend. In 
addition, we analyzed whether the neglect of independent analysts changed during the period of 
analyst scandals. In August 2001, media coverage of analysts’ conflicts of interest skyrocketed 
as the first lawsuit by an investor claiming to have lost money due to biased recommendations 
was settled. In May 2002, extensive changes in the regulation of investment banking 
organization and analyst affiliation disclosure were initialized, and May was the period of the 
initial settlement in the case against Merrill Lynch filed by the state of New York. We take these 
two dates as cutoff points and rerun the regressions of abnormal trade imbalances. Columns 4 
and 5 of Table VIII show the overall reaction of small analysts becomes considerably weaker (in 
terms of the size of the coefficients) and more negative. Moreover, in the sample starting in 
5/2002, small investors start to react negatively to hold recommendations, i.e. appear to discount 
neutral and positive recommendations on average. The reaction to recommendations of never-
affiliated analysts, on the other hand, becomes stronger, both in terms of economic and in terms 
of statistical significance. Differently from the 2/1994-7/2001 sample, the reaction to buy 
recommendations of independent analysts is now positive and (for the period starting in 5/2002) 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Trade reaction to sell and strong-sell recommendations is 
now negative, though insignificant. The other coefficients remain insignificant. (We fail to 
explain the negative, though insignificant coefficient on “Strong Buy.”) This change in behavior 
suggests that small investors started understanding the implications of incentive conflicts after 
they were confronted with stark evidence on the resulting distortions. Information about these 
incentive conflicts was available before August of 2001, and the skewed distribution of 
recommendations made it even more apparent; but the mere knowledge of an incentive conflict 
appears to be insufficient to motivate small investors to adjust. Anecdotes such as Merrill's   38
Henry Blodget privately referring to stocks as “crap” that he had publicly touted may have 
induced small investors to become less credulous and to avoid affiliated analysts. 
VI. Conclusion 
Analysts face incentives to positively bias the information they provide to investors. These 
incentives are reflected in the very low number of sell and strong sell recommendations issued 
by all analysts, in particular by affiliated analysts. They also result in negative returns to 
portfolios that follow analyst recommendations literally. 
The traditional economic assumption that uninformed agents account for the incentives of 
informed agents does not seem to hold for small investors in the market for information about 
stocks. While large investors interpret hold recommendations as sell signals and buy 
recommendations as hold signals, small investors take recommendations literally. Small 
investors also fail to account for the additional distortion due to underwriter affiliation. While 
large investors discount positive recommendations of affiliated analysts even further than those 
of unaffiliated analysts, small investor do not display differential trading reactions. Finally, 
fiercer competition does not seem to solve the problem. Affiliated analysts issue even higher 
recommendations when they face more competition of other analysts covering a stock.  
The lack of downward adjustment to positive and neutral recommendations in general 
indicates that small traders lack the sophistication to account for analyst recommendations. 
Naiveté may also explain small investors’ indifference between affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts. However, the higher informational costs for small traders to identify underwriting 
affiliation are another important explanation for the latter mistake. It is striking, though, that 
small traders do not remedy the informational asymmetry by focusing on analysts from non-
underwriting firms. 
The behavior of small investors gives rise to another fundamental question: Why do 
small investors follow analyst recommendations at all? Why do they display any abnormal trade 
reaction to recommendations – in fact stronger trade reaction than large investors? An obvious   39
alternative would be to invest in a broad index-based portfolio such as the S&P500. Is it due to 
limited attention?  Or to the entertainment value of following investment analysts? Or, do 
investors fear the regret if a recommendation turns out to be enormously profitable? The analysis 
in this paper does not offer an answer to these questions. However, whatever the answer, such 
behavior is certainly consistent with the credulity, i.e. naiveté of small investors of which we 
provide evidence. 
Our findings also have implications for the policy debate about the appropriate 
regulations to be imposed on brokerage houses.  Our results suggest that abstractly informing 
agents of potential conflicts of interest may not be enough to remedy their behavior. Small 
traders started to moderate their reaction to recommendations in general and to rely more on 
independent (non-underwriting brokerages) only after analyst scandals got enormous media 
attention. 
Thus, public and direct “warning” about the recommendations of certain types of analysts 
may warrant more success. Legislative and other public pressure seems to have pushed the media 
into that direction. For example, CNBC now discloses an analyst’s conflicts of interests, 
whenever an analyst speaks on air. The network shows a graphic indicating whether the analyst 
1) owns the stock; 2) the analyst's family owns the stock; 3) the analyst's firm owns more than 
1% of the shares outstanding; 4) the firm does investment banking business with the company; or 
5) other possible conflicts. On the other hand, independent analysts still claim that the media 
tends to pay far more attention to affiliated than to non-affiliated analysts.
25 In other words, 
media bias may have exacerbated the distortions in the first place. 
As another result of the increased pressure on brokerage firms not to provide distorted 
recommendations, some brokerage firms have started abolishing the use of recommendation 
ratings.
26 However, firms with more retail business appear unwilling to take that step. 
Overall, there is little indication that market forces and self-regulation are sufficient to 
induce more sophisticated decision-making among small analysts. In order to prevent small 
investors from naive investment decisions rather intrusive regulatory interference appears to be   40
required. We would like to stress, though, that concerns for market efficiency may lead to very 
different conclusions. We have shown that large investors act exactly according to rational 
theory and account fully for both types of distortions. Moreover, their trade imbalances are, 
according to the classification employed in this paper, about 20 times as large as those of small 
investors. Most of the (abnormal) volume considered is thus likely to be generated by rational 
response to analyst recommendations. Regulation, such as prohibiting affiliated analysts from 
issuing recommendations, would not improve the decision-making of institutional investors and 
may in fact reduce informational efficiency. 
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4 DellaVigna and Malmendier [2004]; Fisman [2003]. 
5 For an overview see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh [2002], esp. pp. 177 ff. 
6 Examples are briefing.com, FirstCall of Thomson Financial, and finance.yahoo.com. 
7 The increasing convenience of online information suggests that analyst recommendations may have 
become more easily accessible over time. Surprisingly, trade reactions to recommendations (Table VII) do not 
display any time pattern and are replicable year-by-year. (Results available upon request.) 
8 Note that the press releases mention the lead underwriter, but do not name the co-underwriters. 
9 For details on management communication with analysts see Francis, Hanna and Philbrick [1997]. 
10 Boni and Womack [2002] cite several press reports and the testimony of the (then) acting SEC chairman 
Laura Unger to the House Subcommittee on July 31, 2001. 
11 See Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter [2003]. 
12 Interestingly, independent analysts had no buy or strong-buy recommendations on any stock at all during 
2002 [Economists, October 23, 2002, “Unconflicted – Wall Streets Independent Analysts”]. 
13 Cf. Glaeser [2003]. 
14 The results are robust to variations in cutoff; see Panel B of Table IX. 
15 Lin and McNichols [1998]; Michaely and Womack [1999]. 
16 The original Lee-Ready algorithm employs a “zero-tick” in the case that a trade is at the bid-ask midpoint 
and the same price as the previous trade. Because of its low accuracy (about 60% according to Odders-White, 2000) 
the “zero-tick” is left out in the modified Lee-Ready algorithm. 
17 A significant number of the firms have either been acquired or dissolved, mostly within the last one to 
five years. 
18 For example, Morgan Stanley acquired Dean Witter for this purpose. Salomon Brothers acquired Smith 
Barney for this purpose. 
19 We are very grateful to Adam Kolasinski and S.P. Kothari for providing us with their mapping, which 
uses corporate websites, news articles from LexisNexis, Hoover’s Online, and the Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations to refine the matches. 
20 Our subsequent analysis focuses on the traditional measures of affiliation (IPO- and SEO-lead/co-
underwriting), both in order to conform with previous literature and in order to minimize the impact of informational 
asymmetries between large and small investors, e.g. about future underwriting. 
21 Note that, as in all empirical work on trade reactions, the coefficient of determination is rather low, 
typically around 1%, revealing large cross-sectional heterogeneity. Since the focus of the analysis, however, is not to 
forecast trade volume but rather to contrast small and large investors’ interpretation of stock recommendations, the 
goodness of fit has very limited role.   44
                                                                                                                                                                           
22 Note that the negative sell-coefficient in the upgrades sample is larger than in the downgrades sample but 
insignificant. The estimation is again affected by the extremely small sample size of the identifying subsample. 
23 We thank Steven Drucker for providing us with the lists of “All Star” analysts for the years 1995 through 
2001. We obtained the names for the remainder of our sample period using the October issues of Institutional 
Investor Magazine. 
24 Table available upon request. 
25 See New York Times, Money and Business Section, on August 17, 2003, “Wall Street’s Harsh New 
Reality,” describing the (past) celebrity status and TV appearances of investment analyst with inside information. 
26 Wall Street Journal on March 1, 2004, commenting on the decision of SG Cohen (and HSBC in the UK) 




Quarterly trade -0.082 0.088
imbalance, (0.000) (0.000)
number of trades
Quarterly trade  -0.089 0.122
imbalance, (0.000) (0.000)
number of shares
Quarterly trade -0.085 0.119
imbalance, (0.000) (0.000)
dollar value
Correlations of the change in the percentage of shares outstanding owned by
institutions (as of their 13f SEC filings) and measures of trade reaction.
Correlations are calculated using all sample firm-quarters from 12/1993 to
12/2002 with both recommendations data and trading data. P-values in
parentheses.
TABLE I. Correlations of Institutional Ownership and Trades
Sum of daily abnormal trade 
imbalances over last quarterPanel A: Entire Sample Sample size
Strong Strong Standard 
Sell Buy Deviation
All 121,130 1.72 2.86 36.84 32.90 25.67 3.78 0.92
Unaffiliated 110,113 1.82 2.95 37.75 32.27 25.22 3.76 0.92
Affiliated 8,466 0.73 1.61 25.68 39.56 32.42 4.01 0.84
IPO lead-underwriting (past 5 years) 1,104 0.63 1.45 23.82 38.41 35.69 4.07 0.84
SEO lead-underwriting (past 2 years) 1,198 0.42 1.50 21.87 39.90 36.31 4.10 0.82
Co-underwriting equity
2 4,143 0.99 1.62 26.43 38.79 32.17 4.00 0.86
Future SEO (next 2 years) 665 0.00 0.30 14.29 45.56 39.85 4.25 0.70
Bond lead underwriting (past year) 2,083 0.62 1.87 27.99 39.85 29.67 3.96 0.84
Never Affiliated
3 6,418 3.91 4.25 36.63 28.01 27.19 3.70 1.04
Sample size
Strong Strong Standard 
Sell Buy Deviation
All 54,952 1.55 2.47 34.99 33.73 27.24 3.83 0.91
Unaffiliated 45,523 1.71 2.59 36.70 32.58 26.42 3.79 0.92
Affiliated
4
8,237 0.75 1.65 25.88 39.43 32.28 4.01 0.85
Sample period is 10/29/1993 to 12/31/2002.
1 The numerical translation scheme is 1=strong sell, 2=sell, 3=hold, 4=buy, 5=strong buy.
2 We exclude co-underwriters who are also lead underwriters of SEO or IPO issuances to eliminate the large number of double-counts in this particular category.
3 A brokerage firm is "Never Affiliated" if it does not have any (lead or co-underwriter) equity or bond underwriting affiliation during the entire sample period.
TABLE II. Sample of Recommendations
Panel B: Subsample of firms with an IPO in the 
past 5 years, an SEO in the past 2 years or a bond 
issue in the past year
Percentage within category Numerical translation
1
Sell Hold Buy Mean
Percentage within category
4 "Affiliated" summarizes the same categories as in Panel A (IPO in the past 5 years, SEO in the past 2 years, IPO/SEO co-underwriting over the same horizons, future 
underwriting in the next 2 years, and bond underwriting in the next year).
Numerical translation
1
Sell Hold Buy MeanPeriod Return SE t-stat. Return SE t-stat. Return SE t-stat.
MM, V (-10,-2) -1.07% 0.17% -6.38 -0.02% 0.04% -0.48 1.05% 0.17% 6.08
(-1,+1) 0.12% 0.10% 1.25 0.70% 0.03% 27.57 0.58% 0.10% 5.82
(+2,+64) -3.51% 0.44% -7.89 -0.75% 0.12% -6.39 2.76% 0.46% 6.00
(+2,+128) -7.89% 0.63% -12.50 -2.07% 0.17% -12.51 5.82% 0.65% 8.92
(+2,+255) -17.83% 0.89% -19.97 -4.48% 0.23% -19.09 13.35% 0.92% 14.46
(+256,+510) -19.22% 0.89% -21.48 -3.61% 0.23% -15.37 15.61% 0.93% 16.87
(+511,+765) -12.02% 0.89% -13.44 -2.10% 0.23% -8.95 9.92% 0.92% 10.73
MM, E (-10,-2) -1.09% 0.16% -6.65 -0.09% 0.04% -2.10 1.00% 0.17% 5.90
(-1,+1) 0.22% 0.10% 2.27 0.70% 0.03% 27.68 0.48% 0.10% 4.79
(+2,+64) -3.71% 0.44% -8.52 -0.91% 0.12% -7.78 2.80% 0.45% 6.21
(+2,+128) -8.75% 0.62% -14.17 -2.95% 0.17% -17.82 5.80% 0.64% 9.07
(+2,+255) -21.36% 0.87% -24.45 -7.50% 0.23% -32.01 13.86% 0.90% 15.32
(+256,+510) -20.95% 0.88% -23.93 -6.86% 0.23% -29.20 14.09% 0.91% 15.55
(+511,+765) -15.31% 0.88% -17.49 -6.07% 0.23% -25.86 9.24% 0.91% 10.20
Upgrade (-10,-2) -1.21% 0.19% -6.21 0.02% 0.06% 0.36 1.23% 0.20% 6.07
MM, V (-1,+1) 1.06% 0.11% 9.42 1.23% 0.03% 44.78 0.17% 0.12% 1.47
(+2,+64) -3.89% 0.52% -7.53 -0.34% 0.12% -2.74 3.55% 0.53% 6.68
(+2,+128) -8.86% 0.73% -12.06 -1.54% 0.18% -8.65 7.32% 0.76% 9.68
(+2,+255) -19.51% 1.04% -18.79 -3.64% 0.25% -14.45 15.87% 1.07% 14.85
(+256,+510) -20.51% 1.04% -19.71 -2.91% 0.25% -11.52 17.60% 1.07% 16.44
(+511,+765) -12.50% 1.04% -12.01 -0.88% 0.25% -3.47 11.62% 1.07% 10.85
Downgrade (-10,-2) -0.34% 0.39% -0.87 -0.10% 0.10% -1.05 0.24% 0.40% 0.60
MM, V (-1,+1) -3.71% 0.22% -16.51 -1.15% 0.06% -20.65 2.56% 0.23% 11.06
(+2,+64) -1.90% 1.03% -1.85 -1.70% 0.25% -6.67 0.20% 1.06% 0.19
(+2,+128) -5.00% 1.46% -3.42 -2.81% 0.36% -7.74 2.19% 1.51% 1.45
(+2,+255) -10.98% 2.07% -5.32 -5.65% 0.51% -11.02 5.33% 2.13% 2.50
(+256,+510) -10.34% 2.07% -5.00 -3.78% 0.51% -7.37 6.56% 2.13% 3.08
(+511,+765) -1.01% 2.07% -0.49 -0.67% 0.51% -1.31 0.34% 2.13% 0.16
Period Return SE t-stat Return SE t-stat Return SE t-stat
(-10,-2) -0.21% 0.17% -1.22 0.59% 0.05% 11.725 0.94% 0.33% 2.813
(-1,+1) 0.45% 0.10% 4.438 0.93% 0.03% 31.762 -0.55% 0.19% -2.848
(+2,+64) 3.63% 0.46% 7.808 3.61% 0.13% 26.96 5.25% 0.88% 5.955
(+2,+128) 6.75% 0.66% 10.216 7.15% 0.19% 37.659 9.53% 1.25% 7.614
(+2,+255) 11.47% 0.93% 12.278 13.76% 0.27% 51.237 15.80% 1.77% 8.922
(+256,+510) 5.23% 0.94% 5.59 11.25% 0.27% 41.812 4.71% 1.77% 2.657
(+511,+765) 9.94% 0.94% 10.621 12.13% 0.27% 45.067 8.80% 1.77% 4.96
Raw Returns for IPO/SEO Portfolio
Affiliated Analysts Unaffiliated Analysts Benchmark
TABLE III. Portfolio Returns
Affiliated Analysts Unaffiliated Analysts
Panel A. The portfolios are constructed by buying in case of buy and strong buy recommendationsand (short-)selling in case of
sell and strong-sell recommendations. The returns are buy-and-hold returns for the various periods specified in trading days.
(Results for cumulative abnormal returns are similar.) MM indicates market model, E equal-weighted market index, V value-
weighted market index, Raw stands for raw returns. The IPO/SEO sample restricts the analysis to firms with an IPO during the
last five years and/or an SEO during the last 2 years. The Benchmark Portfolio is constructed by buying a stock at issuance (IPO
or SEO). The sample period is 2/1994 through 7/2001. 







R b is the daily return of the buy portfolio, consisting of all stocks with at least one buy- or strong-
buy recommendation in the last year. R s is the daily return of the sell portfolio, consisting of all 
stocks with at least one sell- or strong-sell recommendation in the last year.  If the sell-portfolio 
is empty we substitute with the R f, the one-month Treasury bill rate observed at the beginning of 
the month (from CRSP). Portfolio returns are value-weighted by market capitalization. (The 
results with equal weighting are virtually identical.) R M is the value-weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP). SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average daily 
return on the three Fama-French small portfolios (Small Value, Small Neutral, Small Growth) 
minus the average daily return on the three Fama-French big portfolios (Big Value, Big Neutral, 
Big Growth). HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two Fama-French value 
portfolios (Small Value, Big Value) minus the average return on the two Fama-French growth 
portfolios (Small Growth, Big Growth). All factors and the risk-free rate are downloaded from Ken







website. The column entitled Affiliated considers all stocks that are recommended only by 
affiliated analysts; the column Unaffiliated all stocks that are recommended only by unaffiliated 








Panel B. Time-series regression of daily excess returns (in percent) of zero-investment portfolios





-0.010Panel A. Summary Statistics Daily Trading for Sample Firms (2/1990 - 7/2001)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Total number of small trades 66.10 32 102.17 0 3,953
Total number of large trades 45.55 7 128.46 0 3,627
Number of small buy-initiated trades 29.97 13 50.98 0 1,702
Number of large buy-initiated trades 21.49 3 62.14 0 1,911
Number of small sell-initiated trades 26.79 13 42.76 0 2,453
Number of large sell-initiated trades 18.06 3 51.09 0 1,563
Total number of small buy/sell-initiated trades 56.76 26 91.06 0 3,506
Total number of large buy/sell-initiated trades 39.55 6 112.42 0 3,339
∆(buy-sell) initiated small trades 3.18 0 23.71 -1,440 965
∆(buy-sell) initiated large trades 3.43 0 17.44 -660 791
Dollar value total small trades 562,641 244,263 932,865 0 27,500,000
Dollar value total large trades 12,200,000 1,082,491 47,200,000 0 6,640,000,000
Dollar value small buy-initiated trades 255,760 99,175 461,493 0 12,300,000
Dollar value large buy-initiated trades 5,579,860 417,750 22,700,000 0 4,860,000,000
Dollar value small sell-initiated trades 228,392 98,550 387,906 0 16,000,000
Dollar value large sell-initiated trades 4,666,593 382,524 18,300,000 0 3,120,000,000
Dollar value total small buy/sell-initiated trades 484,153 204,600 828,517 0 22,700,000
Dollar value total large buy/sell-initiated trades 10,200,000 918,875 40,000,000 0 5,510,000,000
Dollar value of (buy-sell) small trades 27,368 2,338 201,131 -10,600,000 8,854,894
Dollar value of (buy-sell) large trades 913,267 0 9,824,109 -1,430,000,000 4,860,000,000
N 2,996,265
Panel B. Summary Statistics Trade Imbalance - Sum over Event Days 0 and 1
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
∆(buy-sell) initiated small trades 19.26 5 78.52 -2,545 1560
∆(buy-sell) initiated large trades 18.92 3 55.78 -543 1059
Dollar value of (buy-sell) small trades 161,318 40,428 670,243 -17,100,000 11,800,000
Dollar value of (buy-sell) large trades 4,775,637 369,841 33,900,000 -1,400,000,000 1,520,000,000
Normalized imbalance of small trades 0.1087 0.1265 1.6348 -15.8431 7.1467
Normalized imbalance of large trades -0.0063 0.0141 1.4083 -9.4254 7.1931
N 86,962
TABLE IV. Measures of Trade Reaction: Summary StatisticsLarge Small Difference Large Small Difference Large Small Difference
Trade Trade S-L Trade Trade S-L Trade Trade S-L
Strong Sell -0.103 -0.105 -0.002 -0.118 -0.168 -0.051
(0.039) (0.045) (0.059) (0.044) (0.054) (0.070)
Sell -0.118 -0.139 -0.021 -0.377 -0.144 0.234 -0.134 -0.132 0.002
(0.033) (0.038) (0.051) (0.173) (0.201) (0.266) (0.040) (0.049) (0.063)
Hold -0.091 0.007 0.098 -0.016 0.047 0.063 -0.150 0.013 0.163
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.035) (0.041) (0.054) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018)
Buy 0.011 0.134 0.123 0.086 0.190 0.105 -0.078 0.053 0.131
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027)
Strong Buy 0.112 0.243 0.131 0.144 0.264 0.120
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
(Strong Sell)*Affiliation -0.195 -0.838 -0.642 -0.285 -0.735 -0.450
(0.273) (0.317) (0.419) (0.292) (0.357) (0.462)
(Sell)*Affiliation 0.094 -0.087 -0.180 0.199 0.085 -0.114
(0.247) (0.287) (0.378) (0.260) (0.318) (0.411)
(Hold)*Affiliation -0.001 0.005 0.006 -0.385 0.526 0.911 0.023 -0.026 -0.049
(0.045) (0.052) (0.069) (0.276) (0.321) (0.423) (0.054) (0.066) (0.085)
(Buy)*Affiliation -0.068 0.013 0.081 -0.116 0.214 0.331 0.046 0.083 0.037
(0.034) (0.040) (0.052) (0.089) (0.103) (0.136) (0.064) (0.078) (0.101)
(Strong Buy)*Affiliation -0.129 -0.023 0.106 -0.053 0.088 0.141
(0.036) (0.042) (0.056) (0.059) (0.069) (0.091)
Sample size 86,962 86,962 21,613 21,613 24,520 24,520
R
2 0.0034 0.0085 0.0068 0.0200 0.0088 0.0012
Downgrades Upgrades
OLS regressions of normalized trade imbalance over event days 0 and 1 on dummies for recommendation level (Strong Sell, Sell, Hold, Buy, Strong
Buy) and affiliation. In the three columns titled Upgrades, the sample is limited to recommendations which are upgrades; in the Downgrades
columns, the sample is limited to downgrades. Sample period is 2/1994 through 7/2001.  Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE V. Trade Reaction: Regression Results
All RecommendationsSmall Trades Constant R
2 Large Trades Constant R
2
(in millions of dollars) (in millions of dollars)
(2, 64) -0.879 0.034 0.0008 -0.004 0.033 0.0000
(0.106) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(2, 128) -1.870 0.071 0.0017 -0.010 0.073 0.0001
(0.154) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
(2, 255) -3.540 0.146 0.0025 -0.002 0.014 0.0003
(0.241) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Sample size: 85,577
TABLE VI. Relationship between event-time trading and post-event returns
Regressions of buy-hold returns in percent (over the period of trading days indicated in parentheses in
the first column) on the dollar value of net buy- minus sell-initiated trades (in $m). The sample is
limited to all firms with at least one year of returns following the recommendation. The
recommendation sample period is 2/1994 through 7/2001.  Standard errors in parentheses. Panel A. Clustering Panel B.  Alternative Trade Size Groups
Large Small Difference Large Small Difference
Trade Trade S-L Trade Trade S-L ≤ 5 5-10 10-20 20-50
Strong Sell -0.103 -0.105 -0.002 -0.103 -0.105 -0.002 0.014 -0.125 -0.112 -0.018
(0.044) (0.032) (0.042) (0.031) (0.056) (0.049) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040)
Sell -0.118 -0.139 -0.021 -0.118 -0.139 -0.021 -0.001 -0.094 -0.145 -0.012
(0.031) (0.050) (0.044) (0.030) (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Hold -0.091 0.007 0.098 -0.091 0.007 0.098 0.065 0.005 -0.009 0.008
(0.013) (0.021) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Buy 0.011 0.134 0.123 0.011 0.134 0.123 0.129 0.107 0.070 0.057
(0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Strong Buy 0.112 0.243 0.131 0.112 0.243 0.131 0.182 0.198 0.145 0.101
(0.018) (0.030) (0.016) (0.012) (0.023) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(Strong Sell)*Affiliation -0.195 -0.838 -0.642 -0.195 -0.838 -0.642 -0.695 -0.465 -0.755 -0.199
(0.216) (0.320) (0.463) (0.226) (0.266) (0.333) (0.296) (0.300) (0.294) (0.285)
(Sell)*Affiliation 0.094 -0.087 -0.180 0.094 -0.087 -0.180 -0.105 -0.248 0.033 -0.360
(0.136) (0.184) (0.282) (0.233) (0.275) (0.339) (0.268) (0.271) (0.266) (0.258)
(Hold)*Affiliation -0.001 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.088 -0.089 0.003 0.057
(0.038) (0.050) (0.066) (0.040) (0.077) (0.076) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
(Buy)*Affiliation -0.068 0.013 0.081 -0.068 0.013 0.081 0.013 0.008 0.008 -0.080
(0.061) (0.054) (0.088) (0.040) (0.029) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
(Strong Buy)*Affiliation -0.129 -0.023 0.106 -0.129 -0.023 0.106 0.058 -0.041 -0.029 -0.080
(0.031) (0.032) (0.049) (0.036) (0.048) (0.047) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Sample size: 86,962.
R
2 0.0034 0.0085 0.0034 0.0085 0.0073 0.0062 0.0035 0.0017
TABLE VII. Robustness.
OLS regressions of normalized trade imbalance. Trade reaction is summed over event days 0 and
1. The recommendation levels (Strong Sell, Sell, Hold, Buy, Strong Buy) and Affiliation are
dummy variables. Cluster by Year and Cluster by Brokerage Firm indicate that the standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-year or, respectively, to arbitrary
within-firm correlation. Sample period is 2/1994 through 7/2001. Standard errors in
parentheses.                                                                                                                                          
Cluster by Brokerage Firm Cluster by Year
OLS regressions of normalized trade imbalance.
Trade reaction is summed over event days 0 and
1. The recommendation levels (Strong Sell, Sell,
Hold, Buy, Strong Buy) and Affiliation are
dummy variables. Sample period is 2/1994
through 7/2001.  Standard errors in parentheses.
Trade Size - Dollar Value (thousands)Regressions of Normalized Trade Imbalance, Sum Over Event Days 0 and 1




Strong Sell -0.122 1.066 1.018 0.125 0.197
(0.048) (0.575) (0.618) (0.068) (0.073)
Sell -0.157 -0.204 -0.204 -0.049 -0.130
(0.041) (0.138) (0.139) (0.038) (0.042)
Hold 0.005 0.084 0.122 0.000 -0.074
(0.010) (0.046) (0.050) (0.015) (0.018)
Buy 0.139 0.196 0.243 0.107 -0.030
(0.010) (0.048) (0.052) (0.017) (0.023)
Strong Buy 0.246 0.253 0.286 0.148 -0.041
(0.011) (0.048) (0.050) (0.020) (0.026)
(Strong Sell)*NeverAffiliated -0.002 -1.035 -0.987 -0.074 -0.226
(0.132) (0.613) (0.653) (0.199) (0.244)
(Sell)*NeverAffiliated 0.125 1.780 1.780 -0.139 -0.102
(0.113) (1.632) (1.640) (0.263) (0.288)
(Hold)*NeverAffiliated 0.032 0.102 0.057 0.010 -0.022
(0.039) (0.099) (0.102) (0.069) (0.084)
(Buy)*NeverAffiliated -0.075 -0.394 -0.383 0.143 0.260
(0.044) (0.386) (0.425) (0.085) (0.109)
(Strong Buy)*NeverAffiliated -0.087 -0.168 -0.198 -0.106 -0.029
(0.048) (0.102) (0.104) (0.069) (0.086)
Brokers limited to top 50% sales X
Brokers limited to top 50% employee count X
Sample Size 86,962 4,426 3,959 25,557 14,904
R
2
0.0085 0.0134 0.0175 0.0043 0.0030
Standard errors in parentheses.
2 Employees represents the total number of employees for the brokerage firm issuing the recommendation and is used as a broker size control.
TABLE VIII. Independent Analysts
Difference in Number of Buy and Sell Initiated Trades, Normalized
Feb-94 - Jul-01
Small Trades
1 Sales represents the dollar value of annual sales for the brokerage firm issuing the recommendation, and is used as a broker size control.Large Small Difference Large Small Difference
Trade Trade S-L Trade Trade S-L
Strong Sell -0.149 -0.197 -0.048 -0.153 -0.152 0.001
(0.069) (0.080) (0.105) (0.092) (0.110) (0.144)
Sell -0.256 -0.241 0.015 -0.260 -0.153 0.107
(0.057) (0.067) (0.088) (0.124) (0.148) (0.194)
Hold -0.113 -0.012 0.101 -0.120 -0.010 0.110
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.035)
Buy -0.004 0.145 0.149 0.001 0.145 0.144
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034)
Strong Buy 0.155 0.299 0.145 0.157 0.353 0.197
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) (0.043)
(Strong Sell)*Affiliation -0.149 -0.746 -0.597 -0.517 -1.592 -1.074
(0.276) (0.322) (0.424) (0.621) (0.742) (0.967)
(Sell)*Affiliation 0.276 -0.059 -0.335 0.713 0.510 -0.203
(0.253) (0.294) (0.388) (0.627) (0.748) (0.976)
(Hold)*Affiliation 0.022 0.025 0.003 0.041 0.116 0.075
(0.046) (0.053) (0.070) (0.081) (0.097) (0.127)
(Buy)*Affiliation -0.056 0.005 0.061 -0.056 -0.051 0.005
(0.035) (0.041) (0.054) (0.059) (0.070) (0.092)
(Strong Buy)*Affiliation -0.171 -0.083 0.088 -0.150 -0.156 -0.006
(0.038) (0.044) (0.058) (0.070) (0.084) (0.109)
Sample size 39,632 39,632 11,882 11,882
R
2 0.0058 0.0121 0.006 0.0135
TABLE IX. Analyst Quality
OLS regressions of normalized trade imbalance. Trade reaction is summed over event days 0 and 1. The
recommendation levels (Strong Sell, Sell, Hold, Buy, Strong Buy) and Affiliation are dummy variables.
The Ever-Affiliated Analysts sample includes only recommendations made by analysts who issue at least
one affiliated and one unaffiliated recommendation are included. The All-Star Analysts sample is limited
to recommendations made by analysts who were listed in Institutional Investor Magazine's most recent
October list of top analysts. Sample period is 2/1994 through 7/2001.  Standard errors in parentheses.
All-Star Analysts Ever-Affiliated AnalystsLarge Small Difference Large Small Difference Large Small Difference
Trade Trade S-L Trade Trade S-L Trade Trade S-L
Strong Sell and Sell -0.170 -0.048 0.122 -0.205 -0.070 0.135 -0.274 0.131 0.405
(0.079) (0.091) (0.121) (0.090) (0.104) (0.137) (0.188) (0.211) (0.282)
Hold -0.092 0.009 0.101 -0.094 -0.012 0.081 -0.060 -0.055 0.006
(0.027) (0.031) (0.041) (0.031) (0.035) (0.047) (0.048) (0.054) (0.073)
Strong Buy and Buy 0.051 0.192 0.141 0.057 0.181 0.124 0.034 0.186 0.151
(0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.043)
(Strong Sell, Sell)*Affiliation 0.127 -0.012 -0.138 0.145 0.000 -0.145 0.012 -0.690 -0.702
(0.382) (0.441) (0.584) (0.383) (0.442) (0.585) (0.833) (0.938) (1.254)
(Hold)*Affiliation 0.047 0.166 0.119 0.048 0.171 0.123 0.169 0.327 0.158
(0.116) (0.133) (0.176) (0.116) (0.133) (0.177) (0.201) (0.226) (0.302)
(Strong Buy, Buy)*Affiliation -0.091 0.049 0.140 -0.094 0.053 0.147 -0.060 0.090 0.149
(0.062) (0.071) (0.094) (0.062) (0.071) (0.094) (0.109) (0.123) (0.164)
(Recommendation level)*Sales X X X
(Recommendation level)*Employees XXX
Sample Size 8,767 8,767 8,767 8,767 4,626 4,626
R
2 0.0027 0.0095 0.0029 0.0099 0.0015 0.0117
OLS regressions of normalized trade imbalance. Trade reaction is summed over event days 0 and 1. Recommendation level (Strong Sell, Sell, Hold, Buy, Strong Buy) and
Affiliation are dummy variables. Regressions are based on sub-sample of firms for which Sales and Employee data are available from D&B's Million Dollar Database.
Sample period is 2/1994 through 7/2001.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
TABLE X. Brokerage Heterogeneity[-20,-16] [-15,-11] [-10,-6] -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1
Number of Trades
Small Trade
Mean 99.14 99.67 100.99 102.01 102.42 103.31 105.24 109.57 114.62 110.78
Median 52 52 53 54 54 54 55 59 62 59
StdDev 137.10 137.88 140.32 140.20 140.72 142.08 144.56 145.04 147.92 151.11
Large Trade
Mean 88.85 89.10 90.16 91.63 92.58 93.71 96.85 107.57 114.18 100.79
Median 27 27 27 27 28 28 29 33 36 32
StdDev 176.72 177.94 180.46 182.73 183.54 183.78 187.79 204.15 214.41 192.65
Dollar Volume (thousands of dollars)
Small Trade
Mean 887 891 903 912 916 924 942 984 1,029 984
Median 447 448 453 461 464 468 476 511 543 506
StdDev 1,250 1,257 1,277 1,277 1,280 1,294 1,312 1,314 1,339 1,347
Large Trade
Mean 24,100 24,100 24,500 25,000 25,600 26,200 27,300 32,600 36,400 29,000
Median 5,171 5,170 5,209 5,328 5,418 5,476 5,745 6,600 7,193 6,373
StdDev 63,000 62,800 67,700 65,100 70,500 74,200 70,200 89,400 118,000 74,700
TABLE XI. Trading Behavior Preceding Recommendations
Average trading volume (in number of trades or dollar value of trading) per stock-day during specified event-time period.  Sample period is 2/1994 
through 7/2001.Panel A. Summary Statistics
Mean Median 25% 75% St.Dev.
Recommendation Consensus 3.84 3.87 3.50 4.17 0.51
Difference Recommendation to "Consensus" -0.06 0.00 -0.75 0.67 0.95
Analysts (#) 1.5 1.00 0.00 2.00 1.85
Panel B. Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affiliation 0.131 0.066
(0.016) (0.027)
IPO Affiliation 0.098 0.020
(0.417) (0.070)
SEO Affiliation 0.234 0.131
(0.038) (0.063)
Co-underwriter Affiliation 0.104 0.053
(0.019) (0.033)
Never Affiliated -0.157 -0.138 -0.157 -0.139
(0.015) (0.025) (0.015) (0.025)
Analysts (#) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Analysts (#)*Affiliation 0.035
(0.012)
(Analysts #)*IPO Affiliation 0.046
(0.032)
(Analysts #)*SEO Affiliation 0.055
(0.055)
(Analysts #)*Co-underwriter Affiliation 0.027
(0.014)
(Analysts #)*(Never Affiliated) -0.013 -0.009
(0.009) (0.010)
Constant -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Sample size: 122,730.
TABLE XII. The Effect of Coverage on Recommendation Bias
OLS regression of the difference between a recommendation and the average recommendation
in the past month (consensus) on dummies for affiliation and a dummy for "never affiliated"
analyst, the number of analysts and its interaction with the dummies. The sample period is
1993-2000 (since Regulation FD became effective on Oct. 23, 2000). Standard errors are in
parentheses.
Recommendation Consensus is the average of all analyst recommendations on a specific stock over the
last month. Analysts (#) is the number of analysts who have issued a recommendation for the specific












All 233,698 2,016 2,334 7,524 11,874 222,170 12,442
Agriculture 514 0 14 10 24 490 26
0.22% 0.00% 0.60% 0.13% 0.20% 0.22% 0.21% -0.02%
Mining 15,233 124 192 436 752 14,509 830
6.52% 6.15% 8.23% 5.79% 6.33% 6.53% 6.67% -0.20%
Utilities 12,446 28 202 484 714 11,734 532
5.33% 1.39% 8.65% 6.43% 6.01% 5.28% 4.28% 0.73%
Construction 2,910 8 30 86 124 2,786 96
1.25% 0.40% 1.29% 1.14% 1.04% 1.25% 0.77% -0.21%
Manufacturing 93,768 710 832 2,614 4,156 89,710 5,336
40.12% 35.22% 35.65% 34.74% 35.00% 40.38% 42.89% -5.38%
Wholesale Trade 8,350 96 108 324 528 7,834 476
3.57% 4.76% 4.63% 4.31% 4.45% 3.53% 3.83% 0.92%
Retail Trade 19,572 206 168 584 958 18,664 836
8.37% 10.22% 7.20% 7.76% 8.07% 8.40% 6.72% -0.33%
Transportation and Warehousing 5,980 46 72 222 340 5,660 210
2.56% 2.28% 3.08% 2.95% 2.86% 2.55% 1.69% 0.32%
Information 15,660 160 140 540 840 14,846 966
6.70% 7.94% 6.00% 7.18% 7.07% 6.68% 7.76% 0.39%
Finance and Insurance 36,010 344 306 1,250 1,900 34,154 2,014
15.41% 17.06% 13.11% 16.61% 16.00% 15.37% 16.19% 0.63%
Real Estate and Rental Leasing 2,128 88 58 208 354 1,796 108
0.91% 4.37% 2.49% 2.76% 2.98% 0.81% 0.87% 2.17%
Professional, Scientific,  5,361 48 56 158 262 5,107 306
Technical Services 2.29% 2.38% 2.40% 2.10% 2.21% 2.30% 2.46% -0.09%
Mgmt of Companies and Enterprises 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Administrative and Support and  3,380 56 34 140 230 3,156 200
Waste Mgmt and Remediation Services 1.45% 2.78% 1.46% 1.86% 1.94% 1.42% 1.61% 0.52%
Educational Services 510 6 10 18 34 476 76
0.22% 0.30% 0.43% 0.24% 0.29% 0.21% 0.61% 0.07%
Health Care and Social Assistance 4,232 10 46 214 270 3,962 184
1.81% 0.50% 1.97% 2.84% 2.27% 1.78% 1.48% 0.49%
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 886 22 14 70 106 780 14
0.38% 1.09% 0.60% 0.93% 0.89% 0.35% 0.11% 0.54%
Accommodation and Food services 5,914 24 30 86 140 5,786 196
2.53% 1.19% 1.29% 1.14% 1.18% 2.60% 1.58% -1.43%
Other Services 386 22 22 36 80 324 22
0.17% 1.09% 0.94% 0.48% 0.67% 0.15% 0.18% 0.53%
Public Administration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Appendix Table 1. Industry Summary Statistics




affiliation"On January 16, 2003, Apache Corp (APA), an oil and gas exploration and production company traded on the
NYSE, issued a secondary equity offering (SEO), underwritten by several investment banks. Morgan Stanley
acted as the lead underwriter, while Petrie Parkman & Co, AG Edwards & Sons, Robert W Baird & Co, RBC
Dain Rauscher Corp, Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney, and Raymond James & Associates all acted as co-
underwriters of the $553.7 million common stock offering.
FIGURE I. Sample Webpage of Analyst Recommendations (finance.yahoo.com)
 FIGURE II. Rational and naive trade reactions to analyst recommendations.
The recommendation levels are indicated as (--) for "strong sell", (-) for "sell", (0) for hold, (+) for
"buy", and (++) for strong buy.
* Alternatively, investors may display no abnormal trade reaction since previous negative (sell or hold) recommendations
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